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1OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
This study analyzes the consequences of the switch to market
borrowing, i.e., bond financing of the fiscal deficit with corres-
pondingly less monetisation, as part of India’s structural reforms
initiated in 1991. It basically concludes that the move to more market
borrowings to finance the deficit, instead of monetisation, is proving
to be beneficial. The study is organised into two parts. Part I furnishes
the theoretical rationale for using the Domar condition (GDP growth
should exceed the interest rate) to evaluate the prospects for debt
stability, instead of more recent approaches that test econometrically
for the government’s long run solvency. It then simulates the different
short and long run consequences of alternative combinations of bond
and money financing of budget deficits on interest rates, growth,
inflation, debt/GDP ratio and measures of the interest burden. The
simulations are based upon a behavioural model that is monetarist in
some crucial ways, with the central bank unable to influence real
variables in the long run. However, inflation in the model is not
determined by a Quantity Theory approach based upon stable money
demand, but by an Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply
formulation. The model shows that despite short-run instability, bond
finance does not lead to a long-run debt trap. Instead, it increases
long-run welfare, due to lower inflation.
BOND FINANCING AND DEBT STABILITY:
THEORETICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS FOR INDIA
Vivek Moorthy*
Bhupal Singh
Sarat Chandra Dhal
* Dr. Vivek Moorthy is Professor of Economics at the Indian Institute of Management,
Bangalore and Shri Bhupal Singh and Shri Sarat Chandra Dhal are Research Officers in
the Department of Economic Analysis and Policy of the Reserve Bank of India.
2Part II first empirically evaluates the Domar debt-stability
condition using relevant gross interest rates and concludes, contrary
to some recent studies, that Central Government debt is stable at
prevailing levels of the primary deficit and monetized deficit. The
potential for instability in debt has arisen due to high administered
rates in the Small Savings and Provident Funds schemes, i.e., due
to non-market borrowings. When measures of the net interest rate
are used, taking into account interest receipts of the government,
Domar stability holds unambiguously. It is then argued that bond
finance has contributed to fiscal consolidation, despite higher
interest payments on debt, by inducing the government to reduce
primary expenditures. This conclusion holds even for the combined
finances of Central and State Governments. Robust evidence
indicates that private borrowing costs have come down relative to
those of the government, and credit conditions for private
borrowers are now easier, after the move to bond finance. Further,
some evidence suggests that private capital formation has surged
since liberalisation, contradicting the view that the anti-inflation
policy of bond finance has crowded out private investment and
adversely affected growth. To summarize, despite short-run debt
instability, bond financing of the deficit, i.e., the switchover to
market borrowing has not led to a debt trap nor has it crowded
out private investment, but instead it has helped lower inflation.
The stability in market debt notwithstanding, the overall fiscal
situation is precarious because of potential instability in non-market
debt and due to large unfunded liabilities of the Central and State
Governments.
3PART I
IMPACT OF MONEY VERSUS BOND FINANCING
ON DEBT AND MAJOR VARIABLES
Most analyses of bond versus money financing of the deficit
fails to carefully and adequately analyze their different short and
long run impact upon inflation, interest rates, interest payments
and thus upon the debt burden. It is generally believed that bond
finance (henceforth BF), although less inflationary than money
finance (henceforth MF), is undesirable due to a rising debt burden
and interest payments.1 BF is presumed to lead to rising real
interest rates, which in turn crowds out private investment,
reducing capital stock and thus the real growth rate. In the
extreme, BF may lead to a debt trap in which interest payments
and the debt ratio grow explosively. By contrast, MF is presumed
to be beneficial for growth and the debt burden, because although
it does raise inflation, it lowers real interest rates, stimulates
growth and thus alleviates the debt-trap problem of interest
payments. The influential articles of Solow and Blinder (1973) and
Sargent and Wallace (1983) support this common presumption that
BF is undesirable. By contrast the monetarist view is that BF does
not lead to a debt trap.
This study explains the monetarist view that conclusions
about a debt trap under BF are misleading, since they apply to its
short-run impact. The long-run consequences of BF versus MF are
generally the opposite of the short run consequences. Compared to
MF, BF does not generally lead to a debt trap in the long run and
although it does raise real interest expenditures, BF is welfare
enhancing compared to MF due to lower inflation. The rest of this
part of the study is organized as follows. Section I.1 derives the
debt-GDP ratio formula, discusses the associated debt stability
condition(s), and provides a theoretical critique of the zero present
value of debt criterion increasingly used to assess sustainability of
4debt. Section I.2 explains the rationale for the framework used here
to model the macroeconomic outcomes under BF and MF. This
framework incorporates the monetarist view described above that
BF does not lead to a debt trap, but nevertheless avoids the
Quantity Theory approach to inflation that is the hallmark of
prevailing monetarist analysis of deficit and debt dynamics as in
Darby (1984), and Rangarajan, Basu and Jadhav (1989).2 Section 1.3
explains the full model based on this framework and Section 1.4
presents the simulation results under combinations of BF and MF.
Section 1.5 explores aspects of the Aggregate Demand-Aggregate
Supply approach and points to its limitations as a very long run
theory of inflation. Section 1.6 looks at the impact of the offsetting
crowding out and inflation-risk premium effects upon the interest
rate and thus debt. Section 1.7 outlines the vital implications of
favourable feedback effects from BF to a lower primary deficit.
I . 1 The Debt-Stability Condition
The different short and long run impact of BF and MF can
be analyzed using the debt stability condition in a growing
economy, first outlined by Domar (1944), combined with a simple
macroeconomic welfare (or loss) function in which welfare is
negatively related to inflation and positively to the deviation of
actual output from its potential level.3  A closed economy is
assumed in which debt can be financed only by either domestic
borrowing (BF) or monetization (MF). In the government budget
formula, external borrowing can be easily included as the third
way to finance the debt, in addition to BF and MF. However to
work out the short and long run dynamics of debt under external
borrowing requires specifying behavioural equations for the short
and long run interaction between inflation, the exchange rate, the
external deficit and other variables. This in turn further requires
specifying policy assumptions regarding the exchange rate regime
and the degree of capital-account convertibility. Including the
external sector thus greatly reduces analytical tractability, without
5making the conclusions more robust or useful.4 Analytical
tractability apart, the external sector in India is still relatively small.
Therefore, the broad conclusions about debt under alternative
policies in a closed economy by and large hold for a country like
India5 .
The debt-stability condition can be derived in various ways.
The derivation given below is similar to that in Darby (1984). The
government budget constraint can be written, with the time period
t as subscript as:
PRDEF + Rt * Dt—1 = DHt + DDt I(1)
PRDEF is the primary deficit (PRDEF equals primary govern-
ment spending minus taxes) R is the nominal interest rate on
government bonds, D is the nominal stock of debt. Hence, Rt*Dt—1
is interest paid on debt and the left hand side of I(1) is the total
deficit. DH (called siegniorage) is the change in the stock of (high
powered) money used to finance the deficit6 . DD is the value of
bonds issued in period t to finance the deficit and equals the
change in the value of outstanding debt D, assuming no capital
gains or losses on existing bonds. The Model Schematic in Section
I.3 lists relevant variable symbols and definitions.
Note that D D = gD. Dt-1, where g denotes the growth rate of
relevant subscripted variable. Rearranging (1), substituting for D D,
dropping the time subscript and scaling by nominal income (Y)
yields7 :
PRDEF/Y = DH/Y + [gD - R)]D/Y I(2)
which yields on rearranging,
D/Y = [PRDEF/Y – DH/Y]/[gD - R] I(3)
In the steady state, the debt/GDP ratio is stable i.e. gD/Y = gD - gY = 0.
Replacing gD by gY in (3) yields the equilibrium value (D/Y)* to
6which the debt/GDP ratio converges:
D/Y* = [PRDEF/Y - DH/Y]/[gY - R] I(4)
Using small letters to define ratios of relevant variables (D,
PRDEF) to GNP, the debt ratio can be expressed as:
d* = (prdef–sr)/(gY–R) I(5)
where sr = (DH/Y) is the seigniorage ratio, different from h = H/Y,
the ratio of money stock to GNP.
Equation I (5) is the basic debt-formula first derived by
Domar (1944).8 It holds when there is only BF (sr = 0) and can be
extended to include foreign borrowing (EF), the third way of
financing the domestic debt.9 When the Domar stability condition is
satisfied (i.e. when the growth rate of nominal income gY exceeds
the interest rate R) then irrespective of the size of the primary
deficit (plus seigniorage, if any), the debt-ratio will converge to d*
and the deficit and debt can be maintained forever. Intuitively, the
‘dividend’ provided by adequately high growth is enough to
ensure that the primary deficit and interest can be perpetually paid
for, with debt remaining constant in relation to income. When
stability holds, any value of the seigniorage ratio is feasible for any
value of the primary deficit, so long as the primary deficit is
larger. Put differently, various combinations of monetary and fiscal
policy are compatible, with the debt adjusting passively.
Manipulating the debt-equation condition yields the following
two equations that determine the growth of debt and the debt ratio
during transition or in disequilibrium:
gD = R + [prdef - sr]/dt-1 I(6)
dt = dt -1 [1+gD - gY] I(7)
In equilibrium, the debt ratio is stable (gD = gY) and the
formula I (4) again applies.
7It is common to express the Domar condition as implying
real growth must exceed the real interest rate. Let y denote real
income and P the price level, with nominal income Y = P* y.
Dividing all relevant variables by the same price level P converts
the Domar formula into real terms. The conversion is conceptually
trivial since P cancels out. Operationally though, the formulation
with nominal variables is preferable in many ways, since actual
expenditures and receipts in nominal terms are unambiguous, while
the measures of real growth and interest rate will vary, depending
on different deflators (price indices).
I.1.1 Debt-Stability with Taxes
If there are taxes on interest income at the rate t, then the
stability condition is that the growth rate must exceed the after-tax
interest rate. For simplicity of exposition and because taxes are
empirically not significant in the Indian context, they have been left
out of the analysis. When taxes are present, converting nominal
variables to real terms changes the formula, since with inflation
and taxes paid on nominal interest income, nominal rates must rise
by more than the inflation rate as per the tax-adjusted Fisher
equation to keep the real return to investors constant.
I.1.2 Debt Stability when Growth is less than the Interest Rate
Reverting back to the no-tax case, even when gY < R, the
debt ratio can converge to an equilibrium value under some
conditions. From the formula it can be mechanically seen that for a
sufficiently large seigniorage (when sr > prdef), the debt ratio will
stabilize to a positive level, although at a higher inflation rate due
to higher money growth. This scenario - the need for monetary
accomodation, current or future, to meet the intertemporal budget
constraint when growth is less than the interest rate - was
highlighted and stressed by Sargent and Wallace (1981). They also
argued that current monetary accomodation is welfare enhancing,
8compared to the only other alternative of future accomodation.
The validity of their argument and their underlying assumptions
will be scrutinised later.
The other situation in which debt will stabilize is when there
is a sufficiently large primary surplus minus siegniorage so that
[R - gY]d + prdef – sr > 0 (Fischer, 1980).
In this last case, although there is no debt trap, the primary
surplus is needed to keep paying the interest, for which growth
does not suffice. This last expression can be viewed as a general
stability condition.
I.1.3 Stability versus Sustainability
The meaning of the terms debt stability and debt
sustainability needs to be discussed. Stability can be defined
precisely by the algebraic condition of a converging debt ratio, and
can be precisely identified from the variables in the Domar
formula. By contrast, despite (or perhaps because of) widespread
use of the term sustainability, there is no clear consensus in the
literature as to what it means or implies and no precise way to
define it.  Sustainability is sometimes treated as equivalent to
stability, it is sometimes taken to mean solvency, which will be
discussed later, and sometimes neither of these precisely.10
Sustainability relates to the compatibility of the fiscal para-
meters with the broader economic goals or constraints the society
faces. It is characterised here as follows: even without a change in
underlying fiscal variables – in particular, the primary deficit – it is
likely that the debt will be willingly held by the public in future
periods, subject to any prevailing constraints on values of relevant
macro variables such as domestic and external debt and debt
service ratios, ratio of interest payments to expenditures and
receipts, inflation rate etc. Sustainability entails more variable
constraints than just the growth rate and interest rate, and is thus
9harder to satisfy than stability, which is a necessary condition for
the former.
If a country has self-imposed constraints (by law, as in the
Maastricht treaty with ceilings of 60 per cent debt ratio, 3 per cent
public deficit and an inflation ceiling for entry into the European
Union) then a large primary deficit that leads to debt stability since
gY > R may not be sustainable or feasible since the equilibrium
value of debt violates the debt ceiling. Although a burst of
seigniorage can arithmetically ensure debt stability within the
permissible debt ratio for the given deficit, the policy will
nevertheless be unsustainable if the ensuing inflation exceeds the
permissible inflation rate.
Even when there are no precise macroeconomic constraints
that render a stable debt outcome unsustainable, a debt burden
that is perceived as potentially unstable can be characterised as
unsustainable. Even when current period Domar values imply
stability, if investors feel that the ensuing debt ratio is too high,
some event could trigger a panic leading to a sell-off of bonds.
The ensuing rise in interest rates could lead to debt instability by
the Domar condition. Sustainability implies the possibility of
instability. Assessing whether the deficit and debt are sustainable
requires judgmental analysis of market debt, other government
liabilities and investor preferences and characteristics that are
typically left out of formula-based and econometric investigations.
In particular, the proportions of debt held by financial institutions
and individuals (retail investors) respectively and the extent of
diffusion of retail debt across the population determines the extent
of debt sustainability. In debt markets, retail investors are, in
general, less speculative and tend to buy and hold in comparison
to institutional investors. A 100 per cent debt ratio held mainly by
retail investors may be more easily sustainable than a 50 per cent
ratio held mostly by financial institutions. Similarly the dispersion
of debt across different age groups, tax and income brackets is
10
important. If the bulk of retail debt is held by retirees, who tend
to be income rather than capital gains oriented investors, then
ceteris paribus the debt is more sustainable. In general, debt is more
sustainable when it is more widely dispersed across retail investors.
The maturity structure of debt is also an important
determinant of debt sustainability. While the ratio of short-term to
total debt is a widely used indicator in external sector analysis,
analysis of public debt has not incorporated this factor into Domar-
type analysis. Ceteris paribus, a given debt ratio is more
sustainable the lower is the share of short-term debt. Further, debt
should be measured by residual, not actual, maturity.
In short, stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for sustainability which can be thought of as potential instability.
This study empirically assesses the conditions for stability, with a
forward-looking emphasis on likely outcomes for interest rates,
based on analyzing macroeconomic trends and underlying policies.
Sustainability is broadly assessed here since no precise estimates
can be made.
I.1.4 Stability versus Solvency
Recent analysis of debt eschews direct comparison of the
growth and interest rate. Instead, this literature focuses on the
intertemporal budget constraint to ascertain long-run solvency,
which implies that there must be future primary surpluses or
seigniorage to offset a current deficit. Thus Blanchard (1980) states
that the debt is sustainable if the present value of the taxes equals
the present value of primary spending, interest payments and
repayment of debt. Stated precisely, solvency implies the
expectation at time t that the PV of future debt tend to zero or be
negative in an infinite horizon economy. In a finite horizon
economy solvency implies that debt in the last period be non-
positive (i.e., dt+n<0). If this present value condition does not hold,
11
fiscal policy is on an unsustainable path and requires a change in
underlying policies.
Empirically assessing solvency requires a time series investi-
gation of whether the discounted present value of the debt is
stationary [Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Wilcox (1989)]. If so, then
solvency holds. Buiter and Patel (1992) find from time series tests
that India’s central government debt from 1970-1987 in present
value terms is nonstationary and conclude that debt is unsus-
tainable. However, the theoretical validity of the long run solvency
criterion can be questioned. Solvency implies that the government
balances its books over a long-term horizon. But governments,
unlike individuals are infinitely long-lived and it is not clear why
they should be subject to a solvency constraint. It should be
feasible for the government to run a perpetual primary deficit and
debt, sustained forever by paying interest on existing debt by
further borrowing from future generations. All that is required for
this rational Ponzi scheme to be feasible is that the Domar
condition hold, resulting in a stable debt ratio. Therefore, the logic
of imposing this long run solvency constraint on the government is
not immediately obvious.
The rationale for long run solvency as a condition for debt
sustainability derives from a more subtle consideration: the
dynamic efficiency implication of growth theory which requires
that the growth rate be less than the interest rate.11 Therefore a
permanent primary deficit (adjusted for seigniorage), which is
manageable when growth exceeds the interest rate, is incompatible
with dynamic efficiency. Instead, long run solvency must hold.
Buiter and Patel (1992) emphasize the implications of dynamic
efficiency in justifying their approach to ascertain sustainability by
testing for the stationarity of the discounted present value of debt12
Another way of stating this constraint is that Domar stability
cannot hold since it precludes cost-benefit analysis: when the
stream of benefits grows at a faster rate (gY) than the discount rate
(R), the present value of a project is infinite, which is not possible.
12
There is a fundamental flaw in these arguments pertaining
to the implications of dynamic efficiency for the unviability of a
permanent primary deficit. These arguments fail to make a
distinction between the risky rate of return on capital and the risk
free rate on government bonds. Making this distinction it can be
seen that the Domar condition does not necessarily imply dynamic
inefficiency. The valuation of a stock in finance theory is akin to
cost-benefit analysis. The well-known Gordon growth model is used
to compute the present value (price) of a stock. Consider a stock
that pays a dividend div that grows by g every period. If this
stock is the representative stock for the economy, then g equals gY,
the growth rate of the economy. If R(risky) is the discount rate for
discounting the infinite future stream of divi-dends, then the price
of the stock, obtained as the sum of the series is div/[R(risky) – gY].
For the stock price to have a stable, finite value in fact requires
that R (risky) > gY. There is no contradiction at all in having an
economy in which R (risky) > gY > R(risk free), with both
conditions holding, which is often the case (Moorthy, 1998).13
The empirical methodology employed in testing for long run
solvency can also be questioned. These tests entail choosing
arbitrary discount rates to arrive at the present discounted values
(PV) of the debt. The conclusion about solvency can thus depend
on the discount rate chosen. As Rajaraman and Mukhopadhayay
(1999) have stated, the PV of debt is clearly an avoidable
computational complexity. The robustness of this approach is less
than that using a straight forward comparison of growth and
interest rates. Therefore this paper engages in Domar condition
analysis, using the debt-ratio formula I(5) to evaluate debt stability.
I . 2 Short and Long Run Impact of Monetising the
Def ic i t
The Domar debt equation is often used mechanically for
making debt projections and econometric forecasts, without paying
13
due heed to how the mode of financing affects in turn the macro
variables in the stability condition. To adequately analyze the
implications of different ways of financing the debt requires
incorporating this equation into behavioural macroeconomic analysis
that distinguishes between the short and long-run. The conceptual
foundation for the debt analysis developed here is Milton
Friedman’s (1967) natural rate (of unemployment) hypothesis: there
is no long-run trade off between growth (or unemployment) and
inflation, although there is a short-run tradeoff. The combined long
and short-run responses of an economy with a natural rate (i.e.
supply) constraint imply Friedman’s (1967) monetarist paradox: an
easy money policy leads to high interest rates and vice versa for
a tight monetary policy.14 A monetary accomodation of the deficit
is, in effect, an easy money policy while bond finance is, in effect,
a  tight money policy. Indeed, analysis of the impact of BF versus
MF should be carried out as an extension of Friedman’s (1967)
analysis of the different short and long run consequences of
increased money growth per se, with the added twist of debt
variables. Such an analysis, with an important modification, is
outlined below.
The policy choice that a central bank typically faces is to
what extent, if at all, taking into account the need for debt
stability, should a rise in government spending and thus the fiscal
deficit be accomodated? To tackle this issue, it is convenient to
start with a given level of the deficit, partly financed by
seigniorage and then analyze the impact of varying seigniorage on
the debt.15 The above exercise can then be extended to deal with
the more realistic case of choosing from permutation-combinations
of money growth and bond issuance to finance a rise in the
deficit. Clarifications and limitations of the analysis pertaining to
the stability of money demand, crowding out and the inflation risk
premium, and the impact of BF on the primary deficit are
discussed later in Sections 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7.
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I.2.1 Monetarism Versus the Quantity Theory Approach
Numerical simulations in Section I.4, based upon the model
attained in section I.3, are used to show the impact of varying the
amount of seigniorage used to finance the deficit. These simulations
correspond to two scenarios: tight and easy money respectively.
The novel feature of this model is that although it is based upon a
monetarist approach, the inflation rate in this model is not
determined by the Quantity theory, even in the long run. Rather,
inflation is determined by an expectations-augmented aggregate
demand - aggregate supply output gap approach (ADAS for
short). The ADAS approach is the output equivalent of a Phillips
curve embedded in a natural rate of unemployment equation. Since
unemployment is not easily measu-rable and may not be the
primary supply constraint in the Indian economy context, the
ADAS (output gap) specification is more appropriate.
These simulations show that monetarist conclusions about
the desirability of bond financing need not be predicated on stable
money demand, i.e. a Quantity theory approach. The meaning of
‘monetarist’ in the above statement needs precise clarification. The
following five tenets largely encompass monetarism and the
Quantity Theory:
(i) The natural rate hypothesis: despite a short run trade-off,
there is no long-run trade-off between growth and inflation, from
which it follows that zero inflation should be the final goal of
policy
(ii) The Fisher equation, with the nominal interest rate equals
to the real rate plus expected inflation. The real rate of interest is
exogenous in the long run and not amenable to long-run control
by the central bank
(iii) Friedman’s (1967) monetarist paradox: an easy money
policy leads to high interest rates, which can be deduced as a
corollary to the first two tenets.
15
(iv) A stable/predictable money demand function in a
Quantity theory framework. Stable does not imply velocity is
constant but that it can be fairly well predicted by real income and
the nominal interest rate.
(v) Money supply is exogenous and can be largely controlled
by the central bank.
There is an enormous amount of confused and confusing
literature on what monetarism does and does not imply. The study
finds it not just useful but necessary to distinguish between
monetarism and the Quantity theory, two approaches that are often
mistakenly treated as identical. Many important conclusions in
macroeconomic theory and monetary policy hinge upon clarifying
and sorting out this distinction. The first three tenets, i.e. the
natural rate hypothesis, the Fisher equation and the monetarist
paradox can be regarded as monetarism. The Quantity theory
entails the additional tenets (iv) and (v), that money demand is
predictable, money supply is controllable by the central bank, and
therefore inflation is well predicted by money growth.
Monetarism as defined here is a subset of the Quantity
theory. The former can hold while the latter may not. Empirical
evidence suggests that the Fisher effect is very strong while money
demand is quite unstable, contrary to tenet (iv) listed above.
Simple cross-country tests reveal this wide empirical disparity
between the Fisher equation and the Quantity theory. For instance,
for 14 OECD countries with relatively free debt markets, during
1993 an OLS regression of the (annual average) ten-year
government bond rate on the current CPI inflation rate yields R
—2
of 0.70, a coefficient of 0.81 and a t-statistic of over 5. A similar
regression of inflation on M1 or M2 growth yields R
—2
 of under 0.1
and insignificant t-values. Using five-year averages of inflation on
money growth does not change the results.16 Cross-country
regressions are a particularly good source for inference since the
cross-section data embody structural, long run effects in the current
16
observation, which time series regressions using cointegration
methods often do not reveal.
The fifth tenet listed above pertains to exogeneity of the
money supply. Since total money supply includes not only high-
powered money but also the liabilities of the banking system, the
validity of this fifth tenet (that underlies the Quantity Theory) can
be, and is often, empirically questioned. However, since this
analysis deals only with high-powered money which can be
exogenously determined by the central bank, further discussion of
this fifth tenet is not required. Thus monetarism and the Fisher
equation have held up empirically while the Quantity theory and
stable money demand functions have not. It is not surprising that
major central banks have pragmatically moved away from money
growth targeting and increasingly engage in direct inflation
targeting, a policy implicitly based on an ADAS approach to
inflation17.
The approach defined here as monetarism could perhaps be
called just classical, to sharply distinguish it from the Quantity
Theory. However, it is very commonplace to describe these tenets
(i), (ii) and (iii) as monetarist, perhaps because they were first
clearly enunciated by Milton Friedman (1967), along with the
Quantity Theory tenets (iv) and (v), and jointly used by him to
recommend that the central bank follow a money growth rate rule
to achieve price stability. Therefore, rather than fight conventional
usage, the term monetarist is used here as well to describe the first
three tenets. Besides, the term classical may be too broad and
misleading to describe these (monetarist) tenets, since a classical
view subsumes so many other doctrines not germane to this
issue.18 In a lighter but definitely illuminating vein, monetarism as
defined here could be instead labelled realism, to connote the rea-
listic and pragmatic view that the central bank cannot (favourably)
affect most real variables in the long run. In particular, it cannot
boost real output growth by lowering real interest rates and
supporting the government’s borrowing programme.
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Since money supply is used to partly finance the deficit,
analysis of debt dynamics and its potential stability crucially hinges
on what assumptions are made regarding the macroeco-nomic
impact of money supply. The prevailing analysis of debt
stabilization from a monetarist perspective is also based upon a
stable money demand function and a Quantity-theoretic approach
(Darby, 1984). The seminal paper modelling debt dynamics in the
Indian context by Rangarajan, Basu and Jadhav (1989) is also based
on a price equation linking inflation to the change in reserve
money. Khundrakpam (1998) also uses a Quantity Theory approach
to model inflation. By contrast, the model of debt developed below
completely eschews the Quantity theory approach to inflation.
I . 3 The Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply Output
Gap Model
The model used here is based on an IS/LM approach, in
which output (growth) is determined by the real interest rate. In
this scenario, monetary policy works via its impact on the
(expected) real interest rate, unlike the black box transmission of
the Quantity Theory approach. Inflation is determined by an
Aggregate Demand/Aggregate Supply approach, more specifically
by an adaptive expectations augmented Output Gap equation.
Nominal interest rates are determined by an adaptive expectations
Fisher equation. The real interest rate falls in the short run when
seigniorage is increased and vice versa. This model displays
neutrality properties in the long run: real growth and the real
interest rate are independent of the inflation rate, of the money
growth rate and of the central bank’s actions, and the monetarist
paradox holds. But it is not a Quantity theory model since inflation
is not linked to money growth or seigniorage but is determined
only by the output gap equation.
The simulations developed from this model imply that BF is
less inflationary than money finance. With regard to debt stabili-
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zation and debt policy, the simulations imply that although BF
lowers welfare, and leads to a short-run debt trap for the specific
numerical values of the real interest rate and growth rate used
here, BF raises welfare in the long run without a debt trap. The
accompanying Flow Chart: Model Schematic for Debt Simulations,
outlines the whole model. The equations and relevant variables of
the model can be described as follows:
The exogenous variables are gy* and r*, the long run real
growth and real interest rate respectively.
The inflation rate is P = (Pt - Pt-1)/Pt-1, and it is determined
by the AD/AS approach in the equation below. (P is the price
level).
Pt = Pt 
expected  + a (Output Gap),
where Output Gap = (yt/y*t - 1) * 100 and a > 0
= Pt -1 + a (Output Gap) assuming Pt 
expected = Pt -1 I(8)
gy = f (expected real interest rate), f‘ < 0 I(9)
The growth rate of real output (not its level) is inversely
linked to the real interest rate, in effect, an ad hoc IS curve
equation. The change in monetary policy implies a sequence of
nominal interest rates, listed in the summary Table I.2, to which
there corresponds a sequence of real interest rates and real growth
rates. This ad hoc equation I(9) is used instead of a precise
equation since it is difficult to model convergence to equilibrium
using a precise equation (e.g. gy = constant - b real interest rate).
Why? Because there has to be a period of overshooting (or
undershooting) in the growth rate of real output, for the level of
real output to converge to its trend level. During this period of
over/ undershooting, the normal inverse link between real growth
and the real interest rate has to be suspended.
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The real interest rate in turn is inversely linked in the short
run to the tightness of monetary policy, indicated by the seignio-
rage ratio (sr), with arbitrary values again chosen for this link. In
most macro economic analyses, the monetary policy variable is
typically the money growth rate (high-powered or total money
stock), not sr. When velocity is constant (or a function of income
growth and the nominal interest rate), then in long run equili-
brium sr could be expressed in terms of a corresponding money
growth rate.19 However, since this is not a Quantity Theory model,
it is not just convenient but even necessary to ignore money
growth and express monetary policy in terms of the sr. For these
reasons, in the simulation an arbitrary sequence of values is also
chosen for the short-run impact of a change in the seigniorage
ratio on the real interest rate. The seigniorage ratio sr has no long
run impact on the real interest rate.
The real interest rate is the underlying exogenous variable in
this model. The nominal rate is the derived ‘exogenous’ policy
variable, chosen by the central bank. Operationally the central bank
can only choose the nominal rate R as its operating target or
instrument, not the real rate.20 But in doing so, given expected
inflation from last period, the central bank is effectively targeting
an expected real rate that influences private sector investment
decisions. This would require the central bank to estimate the
private sector’s expected inflation rate. In this scenario, the central
bank knows that, since it cannot control the real interest rate and
growth in the long run, it should periodically adjust the nominal
rate R in response to changing inflation. Nevertheless it can use
the nominal rate R to choose an expected real rate(s) to achieve its
inflation target, ideally taking into account the impact of the real
rate on real growth, inflation and welfare over a multi-period
horizon. For instance, starting from 7 per cent steady inflation, a
nominal rate of 11 per cent, and so a real rate of 4 per cent, if the
central bank raises the nominal rate to 14 per cent by its money
market operations, in effect it has raised the expected real rate to 7
21
per cent. This policy will reduce inflation below 7 per cent because
of its contractionary effect, and so the expected real rate will be
lower than the actual real rate. However, the actual real rate does
not affect economic decisions and so is ignored in this analysis.
The term real rate implicitly refers to the (expected) real rate. In
long run equilibrium, actual and expected real rates are equal at
the exogenous level r*. Thus R, the policy variable chosen by the
central bank, can be expressed as:
R = rexpected  + P
expected = rexpected + Pt-1 since P
expected  = Pt-1 I(10)
Macroeconomic welfare (W) is positively related to the
Output Ratio (y/y*)100 and inversely to inflation, since inflation,
even when anticipated, has significant menu (transactions) costs21
Wt = Outputratiot - lPt I(11)
A rise in output is welfare enhancing even when it pushes
up the economy above its potential level because the coefficient l
is relatively small. (Implicitly, the rise in employment implies a
drop in involuntary unemployment which can exist, even at the
natural rate, as in efficiency wage models, such as Stiglitz and
Weiss (1984)). Inflation lowers welfare primarily due to transaction
costs, as stressed by Okun (1980)22 . Since in long run equilibrium,
the output ratio is constant (assumed 100 here) the welfare function
implies that a goal or final target of zero inflation target is the best
policy. Present-value calculations with the welfare function can also
be used to numerically demonstrate, given society’s rate of time
preference, that for a moderately long but not infinite time horizon,
it is better to continue with the existing inflation rate than push
the economy to low or zero inflation by inducing a recession.
I.4 Simulation Results and the Adjustment Process
The process of adjustment after a change in sr, for the tight
money case, is outlined below. The numerical results are presented
22
in Tables I.1(a) and (b) and depicted in the accompanying Chart I
(a) to (f). The fall in sr raises the nominal (and real) rate of
interest, lowers real growth and raises the debt burden on both
grounds (periods 1 through 5). At the start, sr is 1 per cent and,
given the values of other variables, the debt-GDP ratio is 50per
cent. Then sr is reduced to 0.5per cent, a one-time permanent
change. A debt-trap develops during the transition when the real
interest rate exceeds the growth rate, with the debt ratio rising
explosively. (periods 1 to 4).
However, this instability is temporary or short-run. The
commonly held view that bond financing leads to a debt trap, is
based on an empirically erroneous extrapolation of this short-run
impact of tight money. Since growth has fallen, output level falls
below trend and inflation declines whenever this is so (periods 1
to 6)23. The decline in inflation gets built into expectations and
nominal interest rates begin to fall, and the real interest rate falls
and begins to return to its old level (periods 2 to 6). There is a
final adjustment (periods 6 and 7) when output growth overshoots
its trend value, to enable catch up in output level. From period 8
onwards, all the macro flow variables have returned to their
equilibrium values, with the debt ratio rising stable. The economy
gradually converges to long-run equilibrium with a higher, stable
debt ratio (see simulation results).
The tight money policy does increase the debt burden in an
operational sense since it raises the ratio of real interest payments
to GDP (r.d). For these numerical values, the interest burden rises
in nominal terms also, but this need not always be the case.
Welfare falls during most of the adjustment as real output falls
increasingly below potential, despite the continuing drop in
inflation (periods 1 through 5) but then rises as inflation falls and
output growth rises. The weights in the welfare function have been
chosen so as to heavily weigh the gain due to output, in
comparison to the loss from inflation. Under the tight money
23
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Chart I : Policy Simulation for Tight and Easy Money Policies
(a) Impact of an Easy Money Policy on Interest Rates
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(b) Impact of a Tight Money Policy on Interest Rates
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(c) Impact of an Easy Money Policy on Real Output Growth and
Inflation Rate
(d) Impact of a Tight Money Policy on Real Output Growth
and Inflation Rate
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policy, welfare is higher in the long run due to lower inflation,
with the same output growth.
For the easy money scenario, in which sr is raised from 1
per cent to 1.5 per cent, the outcome is just the reverse of the
tight money scenario. The numerical values chosen are mostly
symmetrical. As the nominal and real interest rate fall, output
growth rises. The output level keeps rising above potential, even as
the real interest rate returns to its equilibrium value. As rising
inflation enters expectations, nominal rates rise above their initial
level. In the undershooting period, GDP growth falls rapidly to
enable actual output to come back to the potential level. In the
long run, inflation is higher, the debt-GDP ratio is lower and
welfare is lower since inflation has risen.
The charts I(a) to (f), accompanying the Tables listing values
of all relevant variables for periods 1 through 10 and 197 to 200,
provide a good picture of the relative impact of more bond versus
money financing of the deficit (or tight versus easy money)
respectively. The summary statistics of the numerical simulations
are set out in Table I.2 which reports values of relevant variables
in long run equilibrium for initial (starting), tight and easy money
scenarios respectively.
The US experience during the early 1980s broadly fits the
outcome in these simulations. Following an extremely tight
monetary policy starting in late 1979, combined with a very loose
fiscal policy starting in 1980, after a debt-trap period (1981 to 1983)
nominal rates fell sharply and debt stabilized, contrary to the
Sargent-Wallace predictions and policy prescriptions, although the
correlation between money growth and inflation remained weak
[Moorthy (1995a,b), Table I.3].
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Table I.2 : Summary Table of Long Run Equilibrium Values
Primary Deficit (prdef) = 2.0%, Real Interest Rate (r) = 4%,
Real Growth Rate = 6%, Inflation = 7%, Seignorage ratio (sr) = 1%
Initial Tight Money Easy Money
Policy Policy
Inflation 7.0% 4.5% 9.5%
Nominal GDP Growth 13.0% 10.5% 15.5%
Nominal Interest Rate (R) 11.0% 8.5% 13.5%
Seignorage ratio (sr) 1.0% 0.5% 1.5%
Debt-GDP Ratio (d) 50.0% 75.0% 25.0%
Nominal Interest Payment/
GDP = R.d 5.5% 6.4% 3.4%
Real Interest Payment/GDP = r.d 2.0% 3.0% 1.0%
Operational Deficit* 4.0% 5.0% 3.0%
* sum of Primary Deficit and Real Interest payments.
Sequence of Nominal Interest Rates Chosen by Central Bank
Period Tight Money Easy Money
Policy Policy
0 11.00% 11.00%
1 14.00% 8.00%
2 13.43% 8.57%
3 12.22% 8.78%
4 11.30% 10.21%
5 10.10% 11.93%
6 10.10% 13.22%
7 8.48% 13.50%
8 8.48% 13.50%
9 8.48% 13.50%
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Corresponding Sequence of Real Interest Rates
Tight Money Easy Money
Period Policy Policy
0 4.00% 4.00%
1 7.00% 1.00%
2 6.50% 1.50%
3 5.50% 1.50%
4 5.00% 2.50%
5 4.50% 3.50%
6 4.00% 4.00%
7 4.00% 4.00%
8 4.00% 4.00%
9 4.00% 4.00%
Table I.3 : Interest Rates and Inflation: The U.S. Experience
(per cent)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1987-89
Average
Ten Year Treasury Rate 11.46 13.91 13.00 11.10 8.56
Inflation (CPI) 12.5 8.90 3.80 3.80 4.50
Real Interest Rate -1.00 5.00 0.20 7.30 4.10
Real GDP Growth -0.50 1.80 2.20 3.90 3.20
Deficit/GDP Ratio 2.80 2.70 4.10 6.30 3.20
Debt/GDP Ratio 26.80 26.50 29.40 34.10 43.50
Source: U.S. Economic Report of the President, 1991.
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I . 5 Inflation Rate Determination in the AD-AS
Approach
It is now necessary to clarify aspects of inflation rate
determination in this AD-AS model, and point out the limitations
of this model as well. When sr is reduced to 0.5 per cent under
tight money, inflation stabilizes at 4.48 per cent. What determines
the long-run inflation rate in the AD-AS approach? The coefficients
of the Output Gap equation and the values of the real growth
rates during adjustment that bring output back to its trend.
Changes in these alter the long-term inflation rate. If, for instance,
the coefficient a on the Output Gap variable in Equation I(8)
doubles to .003 from .0015, then inflation settles at 1.95%, not at
4.48% for the tight money policy. Also, any change in the time
path of output and thus Output Gap during the transition before it
returns to equilibrium permanently affects inflation. Once output is
at its trend level, inflation continues at its prevailing rate.
In this AD-AS model, the inflation rate displays path-depen-
dence. There is no nominal anchor for the price level. Implicitly
velocity is changing arbitrarily, and may be trending up or down
without limit.24 Is this realistic? For the very long run (say period
20 onwards), the ADAS approach to inflation is thus inadequate.
However, for the operational long run (say periods 8 through 20),
the ADAS approach is likely to be more relevant for determining
inflation than the Quantity theory. (The operational long run can
be defined as a time period over which the Fisher equation holds
with the real interest rate constant at its long run value). This
operational long run phase is long enough to ensure that the tight
money policy lowers nominal interest rates, that the debt trap
disappears and that the debt/GDP ratio settles onto a convergent
path, while short enough to allow for significant velocity variations.
It should be reemphasized that the ADAS approach to
inflation used here has significant limitations as a very long-run
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theory of inflation. There is no evidence to suggest that the trend
output growth rate or the short run trade off between growth and
inflation (i.e. parameters of the Output Gap equation) are
particularly stable in the long run, in comparison to income
velocity measures. However, the AD-AS approach used in these
simulations is mainly useful in illustrating that debt can stabilize
under monetary tightening when velocity varies substantially, which
is quite often the case.
I . 6 Crowding-out versus Risk Premium Effects
Under Bond Finance
For analytical convenience, the policy choices above corres-
pond to changing the amount of seigniorage, for a given primary
deficit. The more realistic dilemma that a central bank is typically
confronted with is whether or not to accommodate a rising deficit.
There is one slight difference in this case. The higher primary
deficit and associated debt is likely to raise the equilibrium real
interest rate, unless Ricardian equivalence holds. As long as the
long-run rise in the real rate is small and the stability condition is
still met, the operational policy choice is the same as earlier:
monetary accomodation raises growth in the short run but lowers
welfare in the long run, and vice versa if the rise in the deficit is
not accomodated. Only numerical values of relevant variables will
differ.25 However, if the new higher real rate does not satisfy the
stability condition, then monetary accomodation may be able to
stabilize the debt, as explained earlier in Section I.1.2, provided it
does not induce a further rise in the primary deficit.
When Ricardian equivalence holds, the debt does not affect
interest rates since it has no impact on spending decisions. In the
numerical simulations in Section 5, the real rate was taken as
exogenous. It was assumed to be unaffected by the debt ratio and
thus by the mode of debt financing. Under this assumption, it was
shown that BF is unambiguously better in the long run. When
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Ricardian equivalence does not hold, the larger debt stock, by
raising perceived wealth, will raise consumption and thus the real
interest rate, and more generally fiscal policy will have adverse
crowding out effects. There are compelling reasons why Ricardian
equivalence may not hold - the existence of income constraints and
imperfect capital markets, to cite just two. The major proponent of
the Ricardian view, Barro (1989) has also pointed out its
limitations. Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) provide robust
cross-country evidence against Ricardian equivalence.26
Under non-Ricardian circumstances, the fundamental
conclusion in sections 4 and 5 that BF is preferable needs to be
reexamined. In their analysis, Rangarajan, Basu and Jadhav (1989)
point out that although their model assumes that inflation and
growth are not affected in the long run by bond finance, they state
that the ‘realistic scenario’ under BF would be one in which the
growth rate and inflation are adversely affected due to a higher
real rate. Thus BF can reduce long-run welfare when compared to
MF by reducing growth and lead to debt instability through a
sufficiently large crowding out effect, reducing growth and raising
the real rate.
I.6.1 The Opposing Inflation Risk Premium Effect
Even when Ricardian equivalence does not hold and
crowding out effects are present, it does not follow that BF
adversely influences the real rate and lowers welfare. There are
other macroeconomic effects at work that need to be considered.
Even if a higher debt burden leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher
interest rate, the risk premium effect works in the opposite
direction. The real interest rate has an inflation risk premium
component. While credibility effects are not mechanical and are
more likely to comprise of interest rate responses to discrete events,
nevertheless one can postulate that the risk premium component is
negatively related to actual inflation. Credibility is achieved by an
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actual decline in inflation. The (sovereign) interest rate can be
conceptually thought of as:
Nominal rate = Real Risk-Free Rate + Expected Inflation +
Inflation Risk Premium.
On government bonds, there is only inflation risk, no default risk.
The BF policy lowers inflation but raises the stock of debt.
The net impact is ambiguous. If the risk premium effect is stronger
than the wealth effect, then the real rate will fall and vice versa.27
Not only will the debt stabilize, but real growth will increase.
There is a wide array of broad evidence to suggest that this risk
premium channel of influence is important. During the gold
standard era, yields on long-term bonds were under 3 per cent for
long periods, despite a build-up in debt during war years. During
the 1950s in the USA, despite a debt ratio of over 100 per cent for
some years, 10-year bond yields averaged 2.75 per cent. There is a
burgeoning literature providing empirical evidence, by comparing
the yield on inflation-indexed and regular bonds in the UK and
elsewhere, about the inflation risk premium. This evidence is either
cited or surveyed in Chitre et al. (1996). When the Bank of England
was formally granted independence in May 1997, regular bond
yields fell considerably. Further investigation of the inflation risk
premium and credibility effects on interest rates would be useful in
further analyzing the implications of the mode of debt financing.
The inflation risk premium can be incorporated into debt models,
by making it a function of inflation and thus of the mode of debt
finance.
1.7 Impact of Bond Finance on the Primary Deficit
At a more fundamental level BF may have a beneficial effect
of far greater importance than the favourable impact of lower
inflation on the risk premium component of interest rates. By
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forcing the government to borrow and partially subjecting it to a
hard budget constraint, BF creates indirect pressure to reduce the
primary deficit. This effect cannot be incorporated into a debt
model which has to assume a given primary deficit and then trace
out the evolution of the secondary deficit (i.e. interest payments),
as done above.
However, as a practical matter this effect is likely to be of
enormous importance and worth investigating by conducting
country studies of expenditure levels and spending patterns in
response to changing monetary accomodation. Indeed, a funda-
mental flaw in Sargent-Wallace (1981) type recommendations to
monetize the deficit is that they ignore the feedback effect of
monetization on the primary deficit. The impact of reduced
monetary accomodation during the 1990s on primary expenditures
in India is analyzed in Section II.3 of Part II.
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PART II
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF DEBT STABILITY
AND DEFICIT TRENDS IN INDIA
The theoretical analysis in Part I provided the analytical
framework to evaluate the prospects for deficit control and debt
stability in the Indian economy over the next few years. It is
commonly argued that the present high level of the fiscal deficit
and the associated debt burden represents a potential threat to
economic growth and stability.28 However, opinion is divided as to
the appropriate policies. One view is that greater reliance on more
market borrowing and bond finance (BF) since the onset of
financial liberalization has led to an excessive debt burden, with
interest payments now accounting for about three-fourths of the
fiscal deficit and a third of revenue expenditures during 1990s.
According to this view, less borrowing (or its equivalent: more
monetization of the deficit) would have been preferable despite
higher inflation, since it would have ensured a lower debt burden
and less potential or actual debt instability.29 The opposing view is
that although more BF has pushed up real interest payments, this
switch has been necessary to curb rising inflation, and that any
resulting instability due to more BF has been temporary.
Evidence supporting this opposing view is provided here.
Section II.1 examines the Domar debt-stability condition using
relevant interest rates and concludes that Central government debt
is stable at present, contrary to general views on, and recent
studies of, this subject. This conclusion is very robust when using
measures of the net interest rate, adjusting for interest receipts.
Section II.2 discusses how the empirical evaluation of debt stability
needs to be modified due to declining financial repression.  Section
II.3 provides evidence suggesting that more BF has helped curb
primary expenditures and thus reduced the Centre’s fiscal deficit
and debt ratio, despite rising interest payments. It goes on to look
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at the combined Centre-State finances and tentatively concludes that
the fiscal crisis of the States is not likely to have engendered total
domestic debt stability. Section II.4 documents the decline in
interest rates paid by private borrowers relative to rates on
government debt since liberalization, a very noteworthy
development and Section II.5 points to the enormous rise in private
capital formation simultaneously taking place. Section II.6
summarizes the main results.
II.1 Basic Domar Condition Evidence
The Domar condition implies that the debt-GDP ratio is
stable if growth exceeds the interest rate on government debt and
vice versa. In applying the condition empirically, it is necessary to
choose the most appropriate measure(s) of growth and interest
rates. Debt stability is best evaluated only by comparing nominal
GDP growth with the nominal interest rate(s) that correspond(s)
most closely to the cost of financing Government debt, since actual
interest payments, expenditures and revenues are made at current
prices.
Often comparisons are made between real GDP growth and
some estimated real interest rate. The Domar comparison in real
terms should be eschewed since the results vary substantially with
the inflation measure, i.e. the deflator that is used to compute real
values.30 If the deflator (price index) used to compute real GDP is
also used to compute the real interest rate, the deflation is super-
fluous and cancels out; the comparison is effectively between
nominal GNP growth and the nominal interest rate. However
insofar as the CPI or WPI is used to compute the real interest rate,
as is usually done, an independent real interest rate measure is
obtained. With a big divergence between WPI and CPI inflation in
recent years, the common practice of using the WPI as the deflator
overstates the real interest rate and thus the prospects for debt
stability. Since 1995-96, CPI inflation has averaged 9.9 per cent,
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while WPI inflation has averaged 6.5 per cent (Table 1). This
difference is so large that when assessed in real terms, the WPI
can indicate debt instability while the CPI can indicate debt
stability. Conceptually, the CPI is best for computing the real
interest rate, if needed, since it corresponds most closely to the
bundle of goods consumed and so to the Fisherian adjustment of
nominal rates to expected inflation that keeps the real return to
saving, i.e. deferred consumption, constant. Nevertheless, the Domar
comparison is analytically most meaningful and accurate when
carried out in nominal terms.
Another empirical consideration in applying the Domar
condition is whether interest payments should be adjusted for tax
on interest income received by the government. If all interest
income is taxed at the rate t, then the after-tax rate R(1-t) is
relevant for stability. With a tax rate of say even 20-30 per cent,
taxes paid on interest income can make a significant difference in
ensuring stability. For India, it is empirically valid to ignore the tax
rate since the bulk of interest income is not taxed. Most
government debt is held by commercial banks, the bulk of whose
interest income is tax exempt.31
The basic Domar comparison is made between nominal GDP
growth and different interest rates, using data from Table 1. The
first column in Table 1, labelled gY is the nominal growth rate of
GDP (at current market prices). Upto 1989-90 the old GDP (1980-81
base) series is used and from 1990 onwards, the new series (1993-
94 base) is used. This change in base year barely affects the
measured growth rates, as can be seen in Table 2 which lists, from
1990 onwards, both series and, just for comparison, two other
measures: GDP at factor cost at current prices and national income,
i.e. NNP at factor cost at current prices. The data in Table 2
indicate that no matter which of the four nominal income series is
chosen, growth rates are roughly similar.32 For empirical analysis,
the debt ratio should also be computed using the same national
accounts series that is used to measure growth.
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The choice of interest rate for the Domar condition is not
straightforward, more so for India. In the textbook exposition of
the debt model, as in Part II, there is only one interest rate.
Implicitly, all the debt is one period, and is fully rolled over every
period at the current (market) interest rate. In reality, even in a
well functioning financially open economy, debt is of varying
maturity and is contracted at different rates.33 Short and long rates
on current debt differ, and the weighted average rate paid on new,
currently issued debt differs from that on old, past debt. A careful
analysis of the economic implications of different interest rate series
is thus crucial to empirical Domar condition analysis.
Three major interest rate series that reflect the cost of
financing Government debt are listed in Table 1. The first series is
R(D), the average interest rate on total Central Government debt,
obtained by dividing interest payments on all types of borrowing,
by the previous year’s debt stock. The second rate R(ML) is the
weighted interest rate on market loans, a more ‘forward looking’
measure than R(D) since it comprises only of interest rates on
current borrowings.34 The third series is R(SSPF), the average
interest rate on Small Savings and Provident Fund liabilities,
computed like R(D). As argued in Part I, a straightforward
examination of the Domar condition provides the best way to
assess the prospects for debt stability. As can be seen from Table 1
or Chart II.1, R(D) has always been lower than nominal GDP
growth, although the gap has narrowed considerably in the last
three years. Thus for the average interest rate incurred on all
Central government debt, stability has always held. The second
series to consider is R(ML), the weighted (average) rate on current
loans. The benefits and limitations of R(ML), generally considered a
forward looking measure compared to R(D), as the appropriate
measure of debt costs, will be discussed later. With the exception
of 1997-98, R(ML) has also always been less than nominal GDP
growth. During 1997-98, despite falling sharply by 250 basis points
that year, R(ML) crossed over gY due to the decline in GDP
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Chart II.1: Nominal GDP Growth Rate and Nominal Interest Rate 
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growth, resulting from both a drop in agricultural output and the
ongoing industrial recession. But that year was an aberration; GDP
growth has revived during 1998-99, restoring debt stability with
respect to R(ML). Clearly when the Domar condition is violated
because of a large temporary drop in GDP growth despite a fall in
interest rates, it does not imply debt is unsustainable.
The series R(ML) does not include bills with maturity under
one year. Since short term yields are invariably lower than long
term yields, the weighted current interest rate on all debt would be
lower than R(ML). However, since these bills, which are issued
mainly for cash management purposes form only a small part of
debt, their impact on cost of debt is negligible.
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However, the SS&PF component of debt has shown signs of
instability. The R(SSPF) yield exceeded nominal GDP growth during
1997-98 by a big margin. As is well known, the stickiness of
R(SSPF) in the face of other declining market rates reflects the
guaranteed returns, unchanged since 1991 upto 1998, on PPF
accounts and similar schemes, some of which have been paying
more than 12%. If R(SSPF) rates had moved more in tandem with
R(ML), the potential instability in this debt component would be
lower. The cost of SSPF debt is actually far higher when tax
deductions are taken into account, which has not been done for
R(SSPF). While taxes on interest income are small enough to be
ignored, this is not the case for tax deductions. Some estimates of
the impact of these deductions and exemptions are provided in
Mohanty and Raje (1999). Due to the widely availed 20% deduction
for investments upto Rs. 60,000 in PPF and similar schemes, the
effective cost to the government at a 33% tax rate for PPF deposits
paying 12%, works out to be 18% for the first year. While this
deduction does not continue in later years, the effective rate on
SSPF deposits, as opposed to the average rate R(SSPF) computed
here, could still be well higher than nominal income growth in
current and future years. In short, it is not market borrowing, but
the absence of market borrowing due to guaranteed SSPF rates,
that has been responsible for the potential instability of this
component of, and thereby, of total debt.
II.1.1 Market Responses to Lower PPF Rate
The immediate and subsequent response of yields on govern-
ment securities to the 1 per cent reduction in the PPF rate,
announced in January 2000, supports the view that these high
administered yields are holding up the cost of Government debt.35
As of late February 2000, government bonds of maturities up to
ten years were trading below 11 per cent, typically around 100
basis points or more lower than before the PPF rate cut.
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While the decision to reduce these administered rates is
welcome, on a longer term basis, market indexation of the small
savings schemes needs to be thought out carefully, bringing in
needed flexibility without sacrificing some of the income stability
that is the main feature of such schemes all over the world.
Directly linking these yields to inflation could be problematic, given
the large swings in, and divergence between, CPI and WPI
inflation. A link to a composite, moving average of market rates on
government debt and that of suitable commercial bank interest
rates might be able to provide the right balance between stability
and flexibility. 36
II.1.2 Previous Studies of Debt Stability
Despite the growing burden of small savings schemes, the
data examined above suggest that there is no overall debt
instability.  However, a recent detailed study by Rajaraman &
Mukhopadhyay (1999), which examines the Domar condition for
various interest rates, concludes that there is a debt trap.
They point to the ‘crossover’ of R(D) and R(SSPF), above gY for
1997-98 and interpret the data as indicating that debt is
unsustainable.37
The authors then focus on their preferred measure, the
redemption yield on Government securities, here labelled R(RY),
and investigate it in detail. This is a measure of the yield to
maturity in the secondary market. The authors use a structural
time series model to forecast a redemption yield of 16.5 per cent
upto 2003. They state that “as a long-run forecast for redemption
yields, it (i.e. 16.5 per cent) sets a useful floor for the nominal
growth rate in terms of debt sustainability regimes. Unless nominal
growth is at or above 16.5 per cent, net primary deficits (net of
seigniorage and foreign borrowing) will not be consistent with debt
stabili-zation” (Rajaraman & Mukhopadhayay, 1999).
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Cutting the primary deficit to improve the fiscal situation, a
recommendation of their study, is always desirable and most
definitely so under current Indian conditions. This study
unequivocally endorses this recommendation. Nevertheless, their
basic conclusion – at current levels of the primary deficit and
other variables (seigniorage, foreign borrowing and real growth) the
debt cannot stabilize – is not backed up by the evidence. The
policy ramifications of a correct empirical assessment of Domar
stability in India presently are substantive. If, for some reason the
primary deficit cannot be cut, policy makers may wrongly conclude
from their analysis that a burst of seigniorage is now needed to
stabilize the debt. Not only will the ensuing inflation reduce
welfare, but increasing seigniorage now may induce a larger
primary deficit with deleterious consequences, an empirical effect
that will be analyzed later.
To begin with, as argued earlier, the crossover that occurred
during 1997-98 due to the temporary drop in GDP growth, despite
falling interest rates, should not be interpreted as indicating
instability. Turning to the chosen interest rate measure of these
authors, it is not clear that the redemption yield R(RY) is a better
measure of current debt servicing costs than the weighted interest
rate on current market loans, R(ML) used here. Their rationale for
using R(RY) is that, since it is based on secondary market prices, it
reflects market conditions better than the cost of borrowing in the
primary market. It is certainly the case that the Indian primary
market is affected by primary placement with and devolvement
upon the RBI, and so a measure of current borrowing costs, such
as R(ML) may understate the true current cost of borrowing.
However, the secondary market is very thin and also distorted,
partly because of the absence of a healthy primary market. So
R(RY) is unlikely to be a better indicator of debt costs than R(ML).
More crucially, their time series forecast, and judgmental
assessment has not held up: the redemption yield R(RY) fell by
over 200 basis points to 10.59 per cent during fiscal year 1997-98
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(Table 1). Their conclusion that debt cannot be sustained unless
nominal income grows by at least by 16.5 per cent (forecasted
interest rate) is rather tenuous.38
Another study (Jha, 1999) concludes that the debt is not
sustainable by showing that although Domar stability holds with
respect to R(D), it generally does not hold with respect to the call
money rate and the commercial bank lending rate. While the
author is correct in emphasising that R(D) reflects low interest rate
debt contracted earlier and not the current cost of servicing debt,
it does not follow that the call money rate and the commercial
bank lending rate should instead be used to assess stability. Since
these private borrowing rates incorporate default risk, they are
higher than the current rate on government debt, R(ML).
Assessing stability using private borrowing rates overstates the
scope for debt instability.
II.1.3 Domar Condition with Net Interest Rate
The empirical evidence of Domar stability has so far used
different measures of the gross interest rate, in line with most
previous analyses. For the gross interest rate, stability has generally
held although by a small margin. However, since the Centre
receives interest on its loans, the most appropriate measure of
borrowing costs is the net interest rate. Interest receipts on loans
made by the Centre to States (and other miscellaneous receipts) are
substantial. For the fiscal year 1998-99, interest receipts comprised
40 per cent of gross receipts. Thus, the effective net interest rate on
all Government debt for 1998-99 was 6.27 per cent, well below the
gross interest rate of 10.45 per cent. The last column in Table 1
lists the net interest factor. Multiplying one minus this factor by
relevant interest rates in Table 1 [R(D), R(ML) and R(SSPF)] yields
corresponding net interest rates. Despite falling considerably over
the last two decades, the net interest factor is still large. Thus one
can unambiguously state that for the net interest rate, no matter
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which series is used, debt stability has always held and is likely
to hold by a considerable margin, allowing for the possibility of
significant drops in GDP growth and rises in interest rates.
II.2 The Domar Gap under Declining Financial
Repression
The theoretical monetarist analysis in Part I and simulations
imply that, under more BF, the nominal interest rate on govern-
ment debt will decline in the long run to below its starting level,
when the real rate returns to its long run equilibrium value. This
has not been the case, as is evident from the data in Table 1.
Although the 200 basis point rise in R(ML) during 1995-96 has
reversed itself, by 1998-99 R(ML) had only fallen back almost to
the starting (i.e. 1991-92) level of 11.78 per cent, but had not
declined below it.
However, the failure of R(ML) to decline below its starting
level in response to more BF does not necessarily imply that the
monetarist analysis in Part I fails to explain the long run impact of
BF on nominal interest rates in India, for two reasons. Firstly, the
Fisher effect typically applies after a large and sustained decline in
inflation. Insofar as this has not taken place, there is little reason to
expect nominal rates to decline below their starting levels. The data
on Table 1 suggest that the drop in inflation has been small. The
CPI for the last five fiscal years averaged 9.90 per cent, a small
drop from the previous six years average of 10.46 per cent from
1991-96 to 1996-97, although the WPI has shown a corresponding
large decline to 6.50 per cent from an average of 10.64 per cent.
Since the CPI is relevant for the Fisherian inflation adjustment, it is
not surprising that R(ML) is close to its starting levels.
Secondly, and more crucially, the empirical assessment of
debt stability needs to be modified to deal with (an economy
characterized by) financial repression. When there is financial
46
repression, it is necessary to examine the spread between R(ML)
and R(D), the current and average interest rates on government
debt respectively, and not only the current gap between R(ML) and
gY as per the Domar stability condition (Section I.1).
39 A large
spread between R(ML) and R(D), when the government borrows at
concessional rates, indicates that the primary deficit may be
unsustainable even when the Domar condition is currently satisfied
for R(ML). This is because financial repression cannot be sustained
indefinitely and, without primary fiscal adjustment, would
culminate in higher R(ML). Ceteris paribus, for any given Domar
gap, [i.e. gY minus R(ML)], a lower spread, [R(ML) minus R(D)],
implies an improvement in the debt condition and vice versa.40 A
period of time when the Domar gap falls is an adverse develop-
ment, when viewed in isolation. But if simultaneously the spread
between R(ML) and R(D) has declined due to declining financial
repression, the debt situation may have improved, since there will
be less upward pressure on R(ML) in the future.
A numerical example may help clarify this point. Suppose in
period t, nominal income growth gY is 15 per cent, R(ML) is 10
per cent and R(D) is 5 per cent. The 5 per cent spread between
R(ML) and R(D) due to financial repression indicates that R(ML) is
likely to rise. Thus the debt scenario is less comfortable than
indicated by the big 5 per cent current Domar gap. As financial
repression eases, suppose in period t+5, gY is still 15 per cent,
R(ML) is 13 per cent and R(D) is also 13 per cent. The Domar gap
has shrunk to 2 per cent. However, since R(ML) = R(D), a long
run equilibrium situation, the expected future value of R(ML) is the
same. Hence the smaller 2 per cent gap in period t + 5 may imply
a more comfortable debt situation than the 5 per cent gap in
period t.
The situation in India during the late 1990s to a large extent
fits this last example. Although the Domar gap is currently much
lower and is likely to continue to be so when compared to the
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1980s, this lower gap does not imply that the debt situation is
worse. When the first steps toward financial liberalization were
undertaken in 1985 in accordance with the Chakravorty Committee
recommendations, the spread between R(ML) and R(D) was about
400 basis points. This had declined to 270 basis points at the start
of liberalization in 1991, and as of 1998-99, the spread was 150
basis points (Table 1). This gradual sustained decline in the spread
is an indication, ceteris paribus, of an improved debt situation
under BF even though R(ML) has not declined much since 1991.
In effect the long-run stability that does result under BF is manifest
in the Indian financial markets not so much in a lower current
market rate, as in a lower current spread.
II.2.1 Implications of the Spread Under Financial Openness
When there is no financial repression and government debt
is fully subscribed to by the public, the implications of the
divergence between R(ML) and R(D) for Domar condition analysis
need to be clarified. The long run equilibrium benchmark situation
under openness is one where R(ML) on average equals R(D). The
random walk and rational expectations approach applies in this
situation and current R(ML) is the best predictor of future R(ML).
In this case debt stability can be assessed using only the current
period value of R(ML); there is no extra information about the
debt situation to be gained by knowing R(D).
However, due to the transitional effects of monetary policy,
there is a substantial and non-random divergence between R(ML)
and R(D). When monetary policy is tightened, R(ML) rises relative
to R(D) and vice versa, when it is eased. During the early
transitional phase of tight money, when R(ML) rises relative to
R(D), the current period Domar gap will overstate the debt burden,
since R(ML) will fall as actual and expected inflation fall.41 In
general, other data are required to form a judgement as to whether
the spread between R(ML) and R(D) represents financial repression
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or the temporary tight money phase of a financially open economy,
with opposite implications for debt stability. The Indian economy is
gradually moving to a situation where the spread will increasingly
reflect the stance of monetary policy more than it does the extent
of financial repression.
II.3 Impact of Bond Finance on the Primary Deficit
The evidence presented in Sections 2 and 3 above indicates
that Domar stability has generally held, and that due to declining
financial repression R(ML) is less likely to rise now, compared to
earlier. It still can be argued that BF should be avoided due to the
higher debt burden. As outlined in Part I, BF raises the real
interest payments-GDP ratio and the debt-ratio, for a given
primary deficit. The tradeoff is between a higher inflation rate
under MF and the higher debt burden under BF, with many
economists advocating the former.
However, as a guide to policy the above conclusion can be
misleading because it treats the level of the primary deficit as
exogenous, independent of the mode of financing. This may not be
the case. The link between the primary deficit and the mode of
financing needs to be first examined before policy recommenda-
tions can be made. In a given year, primary expenditures are
decided at the outset as part of the budget process, and to some
extent the monetized deficit is determined endogenously later in
the year. However, over longer periods such as a decade, the
monetized deficit should be treated as exogenous, its magnitude
determined by the degree of autonomy and inflation policy of the
central bank. Thus, over long periods, if the primary deficit and/or
primary expenditures are positively correlated with the monetized
deficit, then prevailing academic analysis of the impact of bond
versus money finance, which assumes the primary deficit constant,
will be irrelevant. Insofar as BF leads to lower primary spending
by imposing indirect indiscipline on the government, BF can reduce
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the total deficit and debt burden of the government. The extent to
which such an adjustment mecha-nism has been operative in the
Indian context is documented below.
Table 3 provides data on twelve different deficit and expen-
diture measures since 1970. Simple stylized facts are documented
below. Comparing decennial averages reported at the bottom,
during the 1980s the big rise in the fiscal deficit over the 1970s
was partially monetized. The rise in primary expenditures went
mainly to increase revenue expenditures, while capital expenditures
increased only slightly. Conversely during the 1990s, despite the
move to market borrowing, the fiscal deficit has reduced by almost
a percentage point from the 1980s. The reduction in the primary
deficit and primary expenditures has been greater than the rise in
interest payments. Although the cut in primary expenditures has
been mainly in capital expenditures, primary revenue expenditure
has been cut as well by almost a percentage point, a noteworthy
development. Comparing fiscal year 1998-99 with 1990-91, at the
onset of the structural adjustment program, is instructive. The
monetized deficit has fallen by about two percentage points (2.5
per cent to 0.7 per cent) and primary expenditures have fallen by
about three percentage points (14.5 per cent to 11.4 per cent).
Despite rising interest payments, the gross fiscal deficit has come
down. However, during the last two fiscal years, there has been
slippage in fiscal consolidation. The monetized deficit has risen
and, simultaneously, there has been some reversal of primary
expenditure reduction.
It should be pointed out here that the inverse link between
BF and the primary deficit outlined here is based on what can be
called a reaction-to-borrowing-pressure approach. This approach
differs from that of prevailing analysis, which is based on the
Keynes-Olivera-Tanzi (henceforth KOT) effect: the price elasticity of
nominal expenditures is greater than that of nominal receipts, due
to nominal rigidities in tax rates and collections. When inflation
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falls, expenditures, much of which is closely indexed to inflation,
fall more than receipts. Evidence of the long-run beneficial impact
of more bond finance via this channel of lower inflation is
provided by Khundrakpam (1998) and Jadhav and Singh (1990),
among others. But this KOT effect relies on nominal rigidities to
obtain this inverse link, and it may not hold for very long periods.
As documented by Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) the KOT effect is of
small magnitude: the response of the primary deficit to a drop in
inflation is about 0.1.
By contrast, under the borrowing pressure approach, even
without a drop in inflation the primary deficit can fall, since the
government is compelled by the difficulties of borrowing to cut its
expenditures. Statistical causality tests also provide some evidence
suggesting that reducing the monetized deficit reduces primary
expenditures (Annexure II.A).
II.3.1 Indicators of Support for Government Borrowing
It should be emphasized that the monetized deficit is not a
very accurate indicator of the extent of the RBI’s support to the
Government. The monetized deficit is a year end figure that may
not be able to fully reflect intra-year variations in monetization that
may have a permanent economic impact. It is a hybrid measure
that combines both primary support (Ways and Means Advances,
primary placements, etc) and secondary market activity (changes in
Reserve Money due to open market operations). Further, for any
given monetized deficit, variations in Net Foreign Exchange Assets
would ease or strengthen the pressure on the government’s market
borrowing program. Hence tests of the links between the
monetized deficit and primary expenditures may not be very
informative.
More concrete measures of borrowing support are the magni-
tude of Ways and Means Advances, to Centre and States respec-
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tively, the absolute or proportional amounts of primary placements
with and devolvements upon the RBI, changes in coupon rates
over succeeding auctions, the ratio of competitive to non-compe-
titive bids in the debt auctions etc. How exactly these measures
would affect the budgetary process and expenditure decisions of
the Government needs to conceptualised, operationally formulated
and then empirically tested. To more accurately test the hypothesis
advanced here - that the government reduces its primary expen-
diture when it faces borrowing pressure - would be an extremely
useful avenue for further research.
II.3.2 Economic Implications of Revenue Deficit
Much of the analysis of the fiscal deficit divides expenditures
into two categories: ‘unproductive’ revenue expenditure (sum of
primary revenue expenditure and interest payments) versus
productive capital expenditure. Typically it is stated that revenue
receipts and/or government borrowing the fiscal deficit should be
used to finance capital expenditure instead of being wasted on
revenue expenditure, considered to be current consumption e.g.
Joshi (2000). It is somehow presumed that reducing market
borrowing will reduce interest payments and thus enable the
revenue expenditure, treated as exogenous, to be spent more
usefully.
This line of reasoning is not valid. First, as the model in
Part II demonstrates, reduced market borrowing reduces interest
rates and payments only in the short run. More crucially, leaving
aside the productivity of capital expenditure for now, the view that
revenue expenditure is all current consumption can be questioned.42
At present, the revenue deficit is due to large interest payments,
essentially a transfer. It can be used for private capital formation
(such as housing) by individuals and for lending for capital
formation by financial institutions. A priori it cannot be ascertained
that interest payments fully finance current consumption. Finally,
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the ratios of interest payments to revenue receipts and revenue
expenditures respectively are not good measures of the debt
burden. These ratios are bound to rise when the size of the
government shrinks as part of the liberalization process. The rise in
the ratio of interest payments to revenue receipts does not by itself
imply a worsening debt situation, although there is a harder cash
flow constraint to be met. The ratio of interest payments to GDP is
a more appropriate measure of the debt burden. Since this ratio
has been fairly constant in recent years (between 4-5 per cent of
GDP in nominal terms, with a small increase in real terms due to
lower inflation, Table 3), the debt burden is not worsening in a
major way. Analysis should focus on the primary deficit, fiscal
deficit and debt ratio, and the ratios of other fiscal variables to
GDP, not to each other.
II.3.3 Impact of Bond Finance on Debt Ratio
From the Domar formula it can be seen that if the reduction
in primary deficit is greater than the reduction in seigniorage i.e. if
numerator prdef – sr declines, then despite a possible rise in R
due to more BF, the debt ratio can decline. Data for various debt
ratios from 1970 onwards, listed in Table 4, provides evidence for
such a tendency. Yearly changes in the ratio are not likely to be
reflective of underlying fiscal changes, due to possible large
variations in GDP growth. But over longer periods, systematic
trends should be discernible. Comparing 1998-99 with 1990-91, the
Centre’s debt ratio has come down by almost 7 percentage points.
All other debt ratios have also declined over the decade. This is a
noteworthy fact and contrary to the general presumption that
continuing with bond finance is making India’s debt level unsus-
tainable. In terms of the Domar formula, the numerator
(prdef – sr) has fallen so much that, despite the fall in the denomi-
nator (gY – R), as financial repression has eased, the debt ratio has
fallen.
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II.3.4 Implications of Shift in Centre-State Finances
An alternative view is that the apparent improvement in the
primary deficit and debt ratio is merely a result of the shift in the
debt burden from the Centre to the States, which are subject to a
growing fiscal crisis, judged by a variety of indicators. To assess
whether the shift in expenditures and borrowing from Centre to
States has led to an unmanageable crisis requires an examina-tion
of trends in, and comparison of interest rates, primary deficits and
debt ratios for the Centre, States and the aggregate (Centre plus
State).
Turning to the primary deficit, the rising primary and fiscal
deficits of the State governments could be a major factor
undermining the stability that currently prevails. However, the
combined Centre-State fiscal deficit has declined since the
financial liberalization program in 1990-91 and, despite the rise in
the States deficit over the last few years, it is lower than at the
outset of liberalization, as can be seen in Table 5. Thus the move
to more market borrowing has not led to a secular rise in the
combined deficit. Given total domestic debt, this shift in the
composition of the debt burden to the States from the Centre can
and should be viewed as a favourable development and not an
unfavourable one. Since State governments cannot monetize their
deficits at all, unlike the Centre which has some scope to do so, a
reduction in their primary expenditures is bound to occur sooner
than for the Centre, thus restoring debt stability. Similarly, turning
to the debt ratios in Table 6, it can be seen that the combined
Centre-State domestic debt ratio (after netting out relevant
liabilities) has fallen slightly since 1990-91.
II.3.5 Unfunded Liabilities of Central and State Governments
This study has concluded, by analysing trends in growth,
interest rates and fiscal variables, that the debt is stable. However,
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debt stability does not imply that the overall fiscal situation is
sound. The unfunded liabilities of the Central and State
governments, arising from employee pensions and other partially
funded insurance and pension obligations are likely to be large. At
present, estimates of the magnitude of such liabilities and the
timing of future cash outflows from the budget on account of
them, are not available. Computing accurate estimates will be
difficult for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the cash
outflows from defined pension benefit schemes are always hard to
estimate because of uncertain life expectancy. Further, precise
information in India on the age structure of the employees covered
by the various schemes, needed to identify retirement ages and to
compute estimate of pension payments based upon assumed life
expectancies, is also not available. Finally, a fundamental difficulty
is that the government's matching contributions to pensions and
similar social welfare schemes are not properly reflected in the
budgetary accounts.
The contingent liabilities due to loan guarantees, foreign
exchange risk guarantees etc., are also substantial. The Central
Government extends guarantees for loans raised by government
companies or corporations, Railways, Union Territories, local bodies,
cooperative institutions etc. The State governments also provide
guarantees for borrowings raised by statutory corporations and
boards, government companies, joint-stock companies, state co-
operative banks and societies, municipal bodies, other institutions
and private parties. At present, the outstanding value of guarantees
provided by both Central and State governments are estimated at
around 9 per cent of GDP (RBI Annual Report 1998-99). These
non-market liabilities which, by their very nature, cannot be
introduced into Domar condition analysis, may pose serious
challenges to fiscal stability.
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II.4 Private versus Government Borrowing Costs
The most important consequence of financial repression is
the spread between private and government borrowing costs. The
impact of BF on private borrowing costs due to the reduction in
financial repression needs to be looked at in order to assess its
overall economic impact. The argument that BF crowds out private
investment by raising interest rates fails to distinguish between the
rate on government debt and private borrowing costs. A financially
repressed regime, with the central bank typically supporting the
government’s borrowing programme will tend to have a large
spread between the rate on government debt and private sector
borrowing costs. Financial liberalization, at a given inflation rate,
will typically result in a rise in rates on government debt, coupled
with a decline in the spread between government and private
borrowing costs.43 When the government preempts a large share of
funds at concessional rates by statutory requirements and similar
means, the market for available private funds clears at rates that
entail a high spread between government bond yields and private
sector borrowing. Thus with financial liberalization, the spread and
thereby private borrowing rates can come down, despite a rise in
government yields.
Evidence of such a development is documented in Table 6,
by comparing R(ML) with two interest rate measures of private
sector borrowing costs - the overnight call money rate and R(CB),
the weighted average of the commercial banks lending rate.
While these rates were subject to, and in some ways still are,
direct or indirect regulation, their high levels reflect the
consequences of financial market repression. In 1984-85, just before
the Chakravorty Committee recommendations were made, the
weighted average lending rate of the commercial banks, R(CB) was
15 per cent, with a 500 basis points spread over R(ML). At the
onset of liberalization, approximately the same spread prevailed.
However, by 1997-98, this spread had come down to under 300
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basis points, with a decline in R(CB) to 14-15.5 per cent. The call
rate, which was controlled until April 1989, was about 400 basis
points higher than R(ML) during 1990-91, but has since declined to
well below the level of R(ML). While R(CB) and the call rate may
not closely correspond with the overall cost of private debt, let
alone with the cost of private capital (debt plus equity), it is likely
that overall private borrowing costs have fallen after liberalization.
The spread between PLRIDBI (prime lending rate of IDBI) and
R(ML) has also declined considerably.44 It is quite noteworthy that
not just the spread, but all private sector interest rates have
declined since the onset of liberalisation (Table 6).
I I .5 Impact of Cutting Primary Deficit on Total
Investment
The evidence indicates that the move to market borrowing
has managed to reduce the primary deficit by more than the
ensuing rise in interest payments, thereby contributing to overall
deficit reduction. It is often argued that such a policy is
nonetheless still undesirable because the expenditure reduction falls
mainly on capital expenditures, thus adversely affecting growth.45
However, the impact on market borrowing on total capital
formation - public and private - should be the criterion. The
columns of  Table 7 list the ratios of public and private capital
formation to GDP. The drop in public capital formation (1.9 per-
centage points) has been offset by a greater rise in private capital
formation (3.8 percentage points) during the 1990s, indicative of a
(reverse) crowding out effect, and not the crowding-in effect that is
often emphasized. Total capital formation as a percentage of GDP
has risen by 1.9 percentage points during the 1990s. The indices of
capital formation may be more informative in some respects, since
the absolute amount of investment and not the ratios to GDP
determine the potential output of a country. The evidence in Table
8 points to an enormous surge in private capital formation since
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1990-91. The capital stock of the private corporate sector is almost
seven times higher than it was during 1989-90. Private investment
is substituting for public investment. Since private investment is
generally more efficient than public investment, the overall impact
on growth is likely to be positive.46
Although some infrastructure component of public capital
expenditure may not be substitutable by private activity, the decline
in total public capital expenditure due to more market borrowing,
as a first approximation, does not seem to have had overall
adverse economic consequences. Thus the appropriate policy is not
to monetize the prevailing level of capital expenditures, but to
direct the lower level of capital expenditures solely towards
infrastructure projects if warranted and to maintain the pressure to
reduce the primary deficit by continuing to reduce the monetized
deficit.
At another level, the view that public spending on and/or
publicly provided infrastructure is needed to boost growth can be
questioned. Noted economists, such as Bauer (1973) have used the
nineteenth century experience to argue that under well-defined
private property rights, the private sector is quite capable of
building infrastructure and even some public goods. As Ronald
Coase pointed out, private ship-owners even built lighthouses, the
proverbial public good. The role of the government is to provide
legal infrastructure by spending on police and on the judicial/legal
system to ensure enforcement of contracts, payment of dues, and to
prevent theft or evasion of payment for electricity, privately
financed tollways etc. When and where the State has provided
legal infrastructure, the private sector has usually provided much
of the required physical infrastructure.
II.6 Conclusion
The major conclusions of the empirical part of this study can
be summarized as follows: First, relevant interest rate data indicate
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no evidence of a systematic shift to an unstable debt regime during
the 1990s. The component of debt that displays potential instability
is that of SS&PF liabilities, because the administered rate has not
been allowed to decline in tandem with other market interest rates.
Second, the reduction in monetization has helped curb the fiscal
deficit by inducing a fall in primary expenditures larger than the
rise in interest payments. Third, the decline in private sector
interest rates due to the move to market borrowing indicates that
overall costs of private borrowing are likely to have declined.
Simultaneously, there has been a surge in private investment
relative to public investment. In short, the move to market
borrowings or bond finance, has been beneficial. Nevertheless,
Central and State Government finances are in a precarious
condition due to large non-market debt, unfunded liabilities and
contingent liabilities.
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Annexure II.A
Causality Between Monetised Deficit and
Primary Revenue Expenditure
Using annual data on primary revenue expenditure and the
monetised deficits ratios to gross domestic product, we tested for
Granger causality between the two variables in a bi-variate vector
autoregression (VAR) framework. The ADF unit Root test indicated
that the monetised deficit ratio is stationary series where as the
primary expenditure raio is stationary after being passed through a
first order autoregressive filter. For a one lag VAR model, the null
hypothesis that the monetised deficit does not Granger cause
primary expenditure can be rejected at the 1 per cent significance
level. Similarly, null hypothesis that primary expenditure does not
Granger cause monetised deficit. can be rejected at the 5 per cent
significance level (see c2 statistics and associated significance levels).
Granger’s Causal Analysis
X causes Y c2 Inference
Primary Revenue Expenditure 4.77 (0.029) There is bi-directional cau-
does not cause Monetised sality between the two
Deficit indicators.
Monetised Deficit does not 7.89 (0.005)
cause Primary Revenue
Expenditure
Looking at generalised forecast error variance resulting from
the VAR model, it appears that monetised deficit has relatively
stronger impact on primary expenditure than vice versa. The
monetised deficit can explain about 20-30 per cent of variation in
primary expenditure over a horizon of 1 to 12 years whereas
primary expenditure can explain only about 7-14 per cent of the
variation in the monetised deficit during the same horizon.
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Accounting for Sources of Generalised Forecast Error
Variance in the VAR Model*
Horizons Primary Revenue Monetised
(years) Expenditure (PREVEXPR) Deficit (MDEFR)
PREVEXPR MDEFR PREVEXPR MDEFR
1 0.88 0.21 0.07 0.97
2 0.85 0.26 0.10 0.95
3 0.84 0.28 0.11 0.94
4 0.83 0.29 0.12 0.93
5 0.82 0.30 0.13 0.92
6 0.82 0.31 0.13 0.92
7 0.82 0.31 0.13 0.92
8 0.82 0.31 0.13 0.92
9 0.82 0.31 0.14 0.92
10 0.82 0.31 0.14 0.92
11 0.82 0.31 0.14 0.92
12 0.82 0.31 0.14 0.92
* Unlike orthogonal decomposition, the sum of the sources will not be equal to
100%.
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Notes
1. In practice, the choice between BF and MF is not necessarily between two
extremes, but between varying degrees of BF and MF respectively. The terms are
used here and should be understood in this latter sense.
2. The analysis here builds upon that of Moorthy (1998), who critiques the Solow-
Blinder and Sargent-Wallace advocacy of BF and also compares the steady state
outcomes under BF and MF assuming stable velocity, i.e. a Quantity Theory
approach. By contrast, this analysis derives values of relevant macro variables
during the transition and allows the velocity of money to vary arbitrarily
throughout.
3. The term potential output is alternatively called natural, sustainable, or the full-
employment level of output. For convenience only the term potential will be used
here.
4. Much macroeconomic analysis pays great attention to determining per se the
outcomes for the current account deficit and nominal and real exchange rates.
But the impact of these variables on macroeconomic welfare via their impact on
inflation and output growth is seldom analyzed. Unless such analysis is carried
out, the current account deficit and exchange rates are just accounting variables
whose economic impact cannot be ascertained.
5. The amount of external borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit and the external
public debt have been a small proportion of the fiscal deficit and domestic debt
respectively during this decade, and can be ignored.
6. The total money stock equals the money multiplier times the stock of high-
powered money. Since total money stock does not enter into the analysis here,
for brevity and for convenience, high-powered money is referred to as money.
However, the symbol H has been chosen to indicate that it is high-powered
money (also called reserve money or the monetary base). Seigniorage here is only
from high-powered money.
7. While all other variables are for period t, money and debt stocks are for period
t -1, but can be approximated by period t values. This approximation is similar
to using the approximation (1 + g)/(1 + R) = 1 + g – R that is used to derive
the Domar condition as the solution of a first order difference equation.
Alternatively equation (2) can be derived using a continuous time formulation.
8. Implicitly, all debt is one period in the basic Domar formula, or the same interest
rate prevails for debt of all maturities. The complications due to varying interest
rates will be discussed later. Capital gains and losses on outstanding bonds are
ignored in calculating the impact of changing R on D/Y in the formula.
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9. With external finance (EF) also, the formula becomes:
d* = (prdef – sr - ef)/[gY – R], where ef = DEF/Y.
10. Different concepts of stability, sustainability, solvency are outlined or discussed in
Spaventa (1987), Blanchard (1980), Buiter (1990).
11. The logic is as follows: in full equilibrium, the marginal product of capital equals
the long run interest rate, ignoring taxes and depreciation. If the growth rate
exceeds the marginal product of capital, society has sacrificed too much and over
accumulated capital. In such a situation, the return on capital is an amount of
future consumption that is less than the amount that can be had by just allowing
for ongoing growth, and the current generation of consumers can gain (and no
other generation of consumers can lose) by consuming some of the nation’s
capital stock. This is explained in Scarth (1998).
12. “We assume in what follows that while the interest rate can be below the growth
rate for extended periods of time, the Indian economy is not dynamically
inefficient, and that there are no free lunches to be had by increasing the public
debt.” (Buiter and Patel, p. 108) Buiter and Patel also make an insightful
distinction between solvency and strict solvency. Solvency by itself does not
preclude the debt-ratio from rising explosively, which is unsustainable. Strict
solvency would also require that the debt-ratio is stationary, or that it does not
have a stochastic or deterministic trend.
13. Abel, Mankiw and Summers and Zeckhauser (1987) test for dynamic efficiency
and claim that it holds since the value of profits exceeds the value of
investment for many countries for many periods. Darby (1984) points out to
evidence for the USA that the long run growth rate has averaged 3 per cent
while the long run real interest rate has averaged 2 per cent. Therefore the
stylized facts are in consonance with both dynamic efficiency and debt stability.
14. The monetarist paradox can be stated more precisely as: higher money growth, or
an easy money policy, leads to higher (nominal) interest rates in the long run.
15. The term deficit here simply refers to the gap between government revenue and
expenditure, whether or not that is financed by borrowing (issuing bonds) or
printing money.
16. For India Rangarajan (1988) and Rangarajan and Arif (1990) use an econometric
model to conclude that money demand is stable over five-year periods. This
conclusion requires more careful scrutiny with 1990s data. For the USA, as
Benjamin Friedman (1988) has pointed out, a well specified money demand
function has been extremely unstable even over five-year periods.
17. The ADAS approach to inflation does not necessarily imply that the central bank
bases its policy on an estimated natural rate of unemployment and/or potential
GDP growth rate. While the central bank may have prior beliefs as to what the
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supply constraints in the economy are, and sometimes act preemptively based on
these beliefs, it can also adjust its policy reactively in response to actual inflation
data. If inflation tends to rise, this indicates that the Output Gap is positive and
vice versa. However, a numerical exposition of debt dynamics using an ADAS
approach entails specifying in advance the potential GDP growth rate. For a
discussion of direct inflation targeting in the Indian context see Kannan (1999).
18. Another fruitful way to distinguish between these two views is to label (what has
been defined as monetarism) the first three tenets as ‘the weak form of mone-
tarism’ while the Quantity Theory can be called ‘the strong form of monetarism’.
19. This can be seen by expressing the seigniorage ratio as follows:
sr = DHt/Yt = (DHt/Ht)*Ht/Yt, which can be approximated by sr = gH/Income
Velocity. When velocity varies arbitrarily, the correspondence does not hold: a fall
in sr need not necessarily correspond to lower money growth.
20. The central bank can alternatively choose some monetary aggregate as its target,
a practice that has been abandoned due to its poor performance.
21. Strictly speaking, welfare should be related not to the Output ratio, but to the
Output gap, which is zero when y = y*. For simplicity, the output ratio is
chosen. There should be another term to capture the standard of living e.g.,
output per capita. Comparing two economies growing at trend (Output ratio =
100) and with the same inflation, the country with a higher per capita income
should have a higher welfare. This term is also ignored here for analytical
convenience.
22. In addition, inflation has shoe-leather costs, if the amount of real balances held
falls with a rise in the inflation rate and thus the nominal interest rate. Even
when money demand is interest-inelastic, or agents hold mostly interest-bearing
inside-money deposits, inflation substantially reduces welfare due to transactions
costs.
23. The initial values for inflation, GDP growth, primary deficit and other variables
have been chosen to roughly correspond to current values. However, it must be
stressed that this is only an illustrative, theoretical simulation. For acutal estimates
of the Output Gap equation for India, see Vasudevan, Bhoi and Dhal (1999).
24. To compute velocity, the starting value of money stock needs to be specified.
Then from the values of the sr and nominal income, velocity for different periods
can be computed.
25. For instance, if the primary deficit rose to 3 per cent of GDP and raised the real
interest rate to 4.5 per cent, then if sr was unchanged at 1 per cent, given other
parameter values, the debt would stabilize at 133.3 per cent.
26. For India, Charan Singh (1999) recently provides strong evidence against Ricardian
equivalence.
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27. A numerical example can elucidate this point. Suppose a 10 percentage point rise
in the debt ratio raises the real rate by 2 basis points while a 1 percentage point
drop in inflation lowers it by 5 basis points. Starting from the base case, under
the tight money policy, debt goes up by 50 percentage points and inflation falls
by 2.86 percentage points. Thus, D real rate = .2(50) + 5(-2.86) = -4.3 basis points.
28. Such agreement is not universal, though. From a Ricardian viewpoint, neither the
deficit nor the debt matter. This analysis eschews the Ricardian view and concurs
with the more general view that a lower deficit and debt are desirable, at any
given level of primary spending.
29. Proponents of this view are Venkitaramanan (1995a,b, 2000), Chandrasekhar (2000),
among others. In recent years, the Economic Survey and other official publications
have repeatedly voiced concerns about the fiscal deficit and the growing burden
of interest payments. However, no clear position is taken as to whether it would
be desirable, at a given level of primary deficit, to increase monetization or
instead tolerate a higher debt burden and higher interest payments. Typically,
fiscal stringency is strongly advocated, while simultaneously the RBI’s role in
helping the Government put through its borrowing program is lauded. (Cf.
Annual Report 1998-99, Sec. 1.2, 1.9, 3.1) Such ambivalence damages the clear
formulation and implementation of monetary policy in the face of a large deficit.
30. However, the interest burden (the ratio of interest payments to GDP) should be
computed in real terms to remove that component of interest payments which is
compensation for erosion of principal (Cf. Part I). Estimates of measures of  the
real interest burden for India are presented in Khundrapakam (1996).
31. For 1998-99, the breakdown of the holding of government dated securities is as
follows : 63 per cent Commercial banks, 18.7 per cent LIC, 2.8 per cent RBI and
15.5 per cent others which includes retail investors. Out of the Rs. 223375 crore
of Government Securities held by commercial banks, Rs. 178505 crore was held to
meet SLR requirements and thus tax exempt (this amount is calculated as 25 per
cent of NDTL for that year which was Rs. 714020 crore for that year). The
taxable portion is thus about Rs. 45,000 crore. With an interest rate of 10 per cent
and a tax rate of 25 per cent the tax paid on this interest income would have
been Rs. 900 crore. Regarding bonds held by the public, due to both tax evasion
and tax exemption upto Rs. 12,000 on interest income, the amount of tax paid on
interest is also small.
32. The cumulative increase between 1990-91 to 1995-96 for the four income series in
Table 2 from left to right are: 141.5%, 140.51%, 142% and 138.4%. The compound
annual growth rates over this period for the old and new GDP series are
respectively 15.87% and 15.56%, a difference that is small enough to ignore.
33. A well functioning financially deregulated economy does not refer here to external
financial sector openness but to the absence of domestic financial repression that
leads to preferential government access to credit and to the lack of an active
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secondary market for government debt that equalizes prices for similar new and
old issues.
34. The implications of the difference between R(D) and R(ML) under conditions of
both financial openness and financial repression respectively will be discussed
later.
35. Rates were reduced effective January 1999 for most of the Small Saving schemes
[for details, cf. Report on Currency & Finance, 1997-98, Pg. 228. However, the
1999 reductions were small, a maximum of 1 per cent, the same as the reduction
for PPF rates in 2000. However, since R(SSPF) is the average rate and all SSPF
deposits made between 1991-1998 pay over 12%, R(SSPF) will decline by much
less than 1 per cent for 1999-2001.
36. An early recommendation in a 1997 conference along these lines was made by
the former Finance Secretary “interest rate deregulation requires that interest rates
on postal savings be made more flexible, perhaps by linking them to interest
rates in the banking system in some way.” [Ahluwalia (1999)]
37. The actual average interest rates R(D) and R(SSPF) Rajaraman and
Mukhopadhayay (1999) have labelled implicit interest rates. They state that both R
(D) and R (SSPF) crossed over g
Y
 in 1997-98 but the data presented in Table 1
indicate that this occurred only for R(SSPF).
38. “Even without the formal forecasting exercise, it is clear that interest rates will
not be forecast to fall, given their steady rise over time (p.69)”
39. It is also necessary to look at the spread between private borrowing rates and
R(ML) in assessing the total economic consequences of the debt, but this
comparison is dealt with later sections.
40. In this Section II.2, the Domar gap is defined with respect to R (ML) but it can
be measured for any rate.
41. This is contrary to the situation under financial repression, under which a large
spread between R (ML) and R (D) implies that the Domar gap understates the
debt burden. Financial repression can be thought of as analogous to the easy
money, Keynesian liquidity phase of a financially open economy.
42. The accounting categories of capital versus primary revenue expenditure may not
correspond to their economic impact. Some of the expenditure on social services
can be considered as investment in human capital. Conversely, some of the
capital expenditure is wages and does not go to creating capital assets.
43. Financial liberalization often entails policies that change in the inflation rate and
thus levels of nominal interest rates. But ceteris paribus liberalization should lead
to a higher government rate and a lower private rate.
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44. The difference between banks actual investment in approved government securities
and the SLR, reported in the last two columns in Table 6, is one indicator of
declining financial repression.
45. Along these lines, in the simulation model of Rangarajan and Mohanty (1997),
monetization of capital expenditures augments capital stock and raises GDP
growth in the long run, at the cost of higher inflation.
46. Khan and Reinhart (1990) have found that private investment has been more
closely related to growth than public investment in developing countries. The
cross-country study by Greene and Villaneuva (1991) finds that there is no
obvious correlation between high rates of private and public investment. This
finding should not be surprising. When public investment is financed by financial
repression this reduces private investment which would tend to offset any
complementarity between public and private investment that may otherwise exist.
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Table 1 : Macroeconomic Variables for Assessing Debt Stability
(Per cent)
Year g(Y) R(D) R(ML) R(SSPF) R(RY) InflWPI InflCPI Net Interest
Factor
1970-71 6.87 3.42 5.37 4.48 .. 5.5 4.5 0.95
1971-72 7.17 3.70 5.30 4.76 .. 5.6 3.2 0.89
1972-73 10.26 4.00 5.26 4.28 .. 10.0 7.8 0.92
1973-74 21.57 4.01 5.26 4.71 5.18 20.2 20.8 0.83
1974-75 18.11 4.64 5.75 6.09 5.79 25.2 26.8 0.78
1975-76 7.55 5.15 6.25 7.26 .. -1.1 -1.3 0.76
1976-77 7.79 5.05 6.38 7.10 5.73 2.1 -3.8 0.80
1977-78 13.16 4.94 6.36 6.12 5.82 5.2 7.6 0.95
1978-79 8.46 4.90 6.52 7.08 5.84 0.0 2.2 0.78
1979-80 9.76 5.53 6.64 7.64 5.87 17.1 8.8 0.62
1980-81 18.94 5.57 7.03 7.22 6.36 17.7 11.4 0.69
1981-82 17.46 5.69 7.29 7.91 6.76 9.8 12.5 0.69
1982-83 11.50 6.64 8.36 8.78 7.34 4.9 7.8 0.72
1983-84 16.54 5.96 9.29 8.71 7.72 7.5 12.6 0.56
1984-85 11.44 6.69 9.98 9.02 8.50 6.5 6.3 0.66
1985-86 13.36 7.16 11.08 8.90 9.03 4.4 6.8 0.61
1986-87 11.71 7.03 11.38 9.47 9.84 5.8 8.7 0.58
1987-88 13.74 7.42 11.25 10.06 10.19 8.2 8.8 0.51
1988-89 18.78 8.04 11.40 10.64 10.90 7.5 9.4 0.49
1989-90 15.42 8.51 11.49 11.05 11.96 7.4 6.1 0.48
1990-91 17.23 8.65 11.41 10.81 12.30 10.3 11.6 0.41
1991-92 15.17 9.09 11.78 11.28 13.36 13.7 13.5 0.41
1992-93 14.45 9.38 12.46 11.06 13.23 10.1 9.6 0.40
1993-94 24.23 9.72 12.63 12.38 13.53 8.3 7.5 0.41
1994-95 18.35 9.72 11.90 12.67 11.55 10.8 10.1 0.36
1995-96 17.36 9.82 13.75 11.72 12.87 7.8 10.2 0.37
1996-97 15.75 10.39 13.69 12.70 12.69 6.4 9.3 0.37
1997-98 10.90 10.22 12.01 12.15 10.59 4.9 7.0 0.39
1998-99 12.45 10.46 11.86 .. .. 6.9 13.1 0.40
1999-2000 .. 10.70 11.77 .. .. 3.0 4.8 0.37
Averages
1970s 11.07 4.53 5.91 5.95 5.71 8.98 7.66 0.83
1980s 14.89 6.87 9.86 9.17 8.86 7.97 9.04 0.60
1990s 16.21 9.81 12.33 11.85 12.52 8.22 9.67 0.39
g(Y) = Nominal GDP growth
R(D) = Average interest rate on total interest bearing debt
R(ML) = Weighted interest rate on market loans (above one year maturity)
R(SSPF) = Average interest rate on small savings and provident funds
R(RY) = Redemption yield on Central government securities
InfWPI = Inflation rate based on WPI
InfCPI = Inflation rate based on CPI
Net interest factor is the ratio of interest receipts to gross interest payments.
Source : Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI, 1999.
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Table 2 : Alternative Measures of Nominal Income
Growth
(Per cent)
Year NNP/FC GDP/FC GDP/CMP GDP/CMP
Old New
1990-91 17.0 16.9 — 17.2
1991-92 14.7 15.7 15.1 15.2
1992-93 13.8 14.1 14.4 14.5
1993-94 17.0 16.2 14.8 14.9
1994-95 18.9 18.4 18.8 18.4
1995-96 16.0 15.9 16.1 17.4
1996-97 14.4 14.2 14.1 15.7
1997-98 — — 10.8 10.9
1998-99 — — — 12.5
NNP/FC: Net National Product at Factor Cost (old series)
GDP/FC: Gross Domestic Product at Factor Cost (old series)
GDP/CMP: Gross Domestic Product at Current Market Prices (old series: Base 1980-81)
GDP/CMP: Gross Domestic Product at Current Market Prices (new series: Base 1993-94)
Source : Economic Survey, GOI, Various Issues.
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Table 4 : Trends in Central and State Debt
(Per cent of GDP)
Fiscal Year Centre States Centre & External* Public Debt
(End-March) (Domestic)$ States (To- (Centre) (All
tal Domestic) Combined)
1980-81 35.6 17.6 40.8 8.3 49.1
1981-82 35.0 17.4 40.4 7.7 48.1
1982-83 40.0 18.4 45.1 7.7 52.8
1983-84 38.6 18.3 43.9 7.3 51.2
1984-85 41.8 19.3 47.9 7.2 55.1
1985-86 45.5 20.5 51.5 6.9 58.5
1986-87 49.9 20.7 56.1 6.9 63.0
1987-88 51.7 21.0 57.9 7.0 64.9
1988-89 51.5 20.5 57.8 6.5 64.3
1989-90 52.5 20.6 59.1 6.2 65.3
1990-91 52.9 20.6 59.6 5.9 65.5
1991-92 51.5 20.5 58.5 6.0 64.5
1992-93 50.9 20.1 58.2 6.0 64.2
1993-94 49.1 18.3 55.8 5.4 61.2
1994-95 47.0 17.8 53.7 4.9 58.6
1995-96 45.6 17.4 52.4 4.2 56.6
1996-97 44.1 17.3 51.0 3.8 54.9
1997-98 46.2 18.0 53.5 3.5 57.0
1998-99 (RE) 46.6 19.4 54.8 3.2 58.0
1999-00 (BE) 46.7 20.5 57.0 2.8 59.8
$ Domestic debt of the Central government = Marketable Debt + Other Liabilities (i.e.
Small Savings, provident funds, Other Deposits etc.).
* At historical exchange rate.
Source : Same as Table 1.
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Table 5 : Central and State Government Deficits
(Per cent of GDP)
Primary Deficit Gross Fiscal Deficit
Year Centre State Combined Centre State Combined
1990-91 4.32 1.89 5.3 8.33 3.51 10
1991-92 1.58 1.29 2.4 5.89 3.06 7.4
1992-93 1.29 1.09 2.3 5.69 2.96 7.4
1993-94 2.68 0.55 3.2 6.87 2.35 8.1
1994-95 1.31 0.80 1.9 5.56 2.67 6.9
1995-96 0.84 0.78 1.5 4.95 2.58 6.4
1996-97 0.51 0.83 1.2 4.73 2.64 6.2
1997-98 1.49 0.90 2.1 5.69 2.83 7.1
1998-99 (RE) 1.51 2.18 3.2 5.90 4.28 8.5
1999-2000 (BE) -0.40 1.65 2.1 4.00 3.90 7.5
Source : Annual Report, RBI, Various Issues upto 1998-99.
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Table 6 : Interest Rates on Government Bonds vis-à-vis
other Market Interest Rates
(Per cent)
Year R(ML) R(Lwgt) R(LSBI) R(Call) PLRIDBI SLR INV/NDTL
1970-71 5.37 9.38 7.00-8.50 6.38 8.50
1971-72 5.30 8.50 5.16 8.50
1972-73 5.26 8.50 4.15 8.50
1973-74 5.26 8.50-9.00 7.83 9.00
1974-75 5.75 9.00-13.50 12.82 10.25
1975-76 6.25 13.78 14.00 10.55 11.00
1976-77 6.38 14.00 10.84 11.00
1977-78 6.36 13.00 9.28 11.00
1978-79 6.52 13.00 7.57 11.00
1979-80 6.64 14.90 16.50 8.47 11.00
1980-81 7.03 14.82 16.50 7.12 14.00 34.0 34.7
1981-82 7.29 14.73 16.50 8.96 14.00 34.5-35.0 34.6
1982-83 8.36 14.60 16.50 8.78 14.00 34.5-35.0 35.7
1983-84 9.29 14.50 16.50 8.63 14.00 34.5-35.0 35.1
1984-85 9.98 15.03 16.50 9.95 14.00 35.0-36.0 38.9
1985-86 11.08 14.42 16.50 10.00 14.00 36.5-37.0 35.8
1986-87 11.38 14.29 16.50 9.99 14.00 37.0 37.6
1987-88 11.25 14.10 16.50 9.88 14.00 37.5-38.0 39.4
1988-89 11.40 14.62 16.50 9.77 14.00 38.0 39.0
1989-90 11.49 14.94 16.50 11.49 14.00 38.0 38.6
1990-91 11.41 16.38 16.50 15.85 14.00-15.00 38.0-38.5 39.0
1991-92 11.78 16.70 16.50 19.57 18.00-20.00 38.5 39.1
1992-93 12.46 16.00 19.00 14.42 17.00-19.00 37.25-38.5 39.3
1993-94 12.63 16.40 19.00 6.99 14.50-17.50 37.25-34.75 42.1
1994-95 11.90 15.00 15.00 9.40 15.00 31.50-34.75 38.6
1995-96 13.75 16.50 16.50 17.73 16.00-19.00 31.5 38.0
1996-97 13.69 14.00-15.50 14.50 7.84 16.20 31.5 37.7
1997-98 12.01 .. 14.00 8.69 13.30 25.0-31.50 36.1
1998-99 11.86 .. 12.00-14.00 7.83 13.50 25.0 36.5
1999-2000 11.77 .. .. 4.00-9.50 .. 25.0 34.3
Averages
1970s 5.91 12.69 12.50 8.31 9.98 .. ..
1980s 9.86 14.61 16.50 9.46 14.00 36.75 36.93
1990s 12.33 16.16 16.38 12.04 14.50 31.63 38.48
R(ML) = weighted interest rate on market loans (above one year maturity)
R(Lwgt) = Weighted average commercial bank lending rates
R(LSBI) = SBI advance rate,             R(Call) = commercial bank call money rates
PLRIDBI = Prime lending rate of IDBI     SLR = Statutory Liquidity Ratio
INV/NDTL = Ratio of commercial banks’ investment in government securities to net demand and
time liabilities.
Source : Same as Table 1.
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Table 7 : Trends in Public and Private Capital
Formation
(Per cent of GDP)
Year Public Sector Private Sector Total
1980-81 8.7 12.3 22.7
1981-82 10.4 13.4 21.4
1982-83 11.1 11.4 20.4
1983-84 10.0 11.1 20.1
1984-85 10.8 10.3 19.7
1985-86 11.2 13.0 22.2
1986-87 11.7 11.5 20.9
1987-88 9.9 12.6 22.9
1988-89 9.9 14.4 24.5
1989-90 10.0 14.1 25.1
1990-91 9.7 15.5 27.7
1991-92 9.2 13.5 23.4
1992-93 8.9 15.1 23.9
1993-94 8.2 13.0 23.1
1994-95 8.8 14.8 26.1
1995-96 7.6 18.9 27.2
1996-97 7.0 14.9 24.6
1997-98 6.7 16.7 26.2
1998-99 6.6 15.2 23.4
Source : Economic Survey, GOI, 1999-2000.
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Table 8 : Comparative Index of Public and Private
Capital Formation
(Per cent)
Year Public Private Households Gross
Sector Corporate Capital
Sector Formation
1970-71 6.2 5.3 7.8 6.3
1971-72 7.2 6.7 8.8 7.0
1972-73 8.2 6.9 8.1 7.1
1973-74 10.4 8.4 10.9 10.3
1974-75 12.2 14.0 13.7 11.7
1975-76 16.6 11.1 14.8 12.9
1976-77 18.8 6.7 17.4 14.6
1977-78 17.2 12.1 19.5 16.4
1978-79 21.7 11.6 24.5 21.2
1979-80 25.9 15.7 26.3 22.0
1980-81 25.8 17.8 29.2 26.9
1981-82 36.4 47.2 27.0 29.8
1982-83 43.3 52.2 22.7 31.7
1983-84 45.6 36.0 35.4 36.5
1984-85 55.0 52.3 30.5 39.7
1985-86 64.6 74.5 43.3 50.7
1986-87 74.9 80.2 40.3 53.3
1987-88 72.6 62.2 65.8 66.7
1988-89 86.4 82.7 90.7 84.6
1989-90 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1990-91 114.5 119.4 132.3 129.3
1991-92 124.1 187.8 104.2 126.1
1992-93 137.7 245.5 131.2 147.4
1993-94 155.5 252.1 138.2 173.1
1994-95 194.1 360.8 176.4 230.2
1995-96 198.2 564.9 249.4 280.6
1996-97 209.4 545.2 280.8 292.5
1997-98 221.9 680.5 276.1 346.0
Source : Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI, 1999.
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